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LEAD ARTICLE
RACE, RIGHTS, AND THE
REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN
BARRY C. FELD* AND PERRY L. MORIEARTY**
Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court issued what is arguably the most
consequential decision in the history of the American juvenile court. In re
Gault imported to the juvenile court some of the criminal court’s core
constitutional protections, including, most notably, the right to counsel. Two
of the Court’s primary objectives in Gault were to enhance procedural fairness
and alleviate racial injustice in the juvenile court. Yet, a half century later,
neither of these objectives has been realized. Gault’s procedural deficits are
well-documented and the subject of numerous publications commemorating the
decision’s 50th Anniversary. This Article examines the second objective. We
claim that Gault did not just fail to alleviate racial injustice in the juvenile
court; it may have exacerbated it. By endorsing a formal and adversarial court
process for children, but failing to confer the full panoply of constitutional
rights afforded adults, Gault helped transform the juvenile court from a quasisocial welfare agency into a second-class criminal court that metes out the
punishment but lacks the protection of its adult counterpart. Compounding
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the toll of this institutional reorientation was a corresponding political
backlash that produced a series of exceptionally harsh juvenile laws and
policies. Juveniles of color bore the brunt of these developments.
The juvenile court is once again at a constitutional crossroads. Catalyzed by
a series of recent Supreme Court decisions recognizing that children are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of punishment, legislatures
and courts are engaged in reform. Gault’s racial legacy deserves attention.
While buttressing Gault’s procedural protections remains important, even the
best-trained and best-funded defense lawyers cannot prevent the primary causes
of racial injustice in the juvenile court: the over-criminalization, over-policing,
over-punishment, and long-standing demonizing of youth of color and the
pervasiveness of implicit racial biases among those who determine their fates.
These substantive inequities require substantive policy reforms. This may be
one of Gault’s most significant lessons.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ................................................................................................ 745
I. Race and the Road to Gault ................................................................. 755
A. Race, Civil Rights, and the Supreme Court............................ 755
1. The Great Migration .......................................................... 755
2. The emerging Civil Rights Movement ............................. 757
3. “Discrete and insular minorities” ...................................... 758
4. The Warren Court .............................................................. 759
B. Race, Paternalism, and the Juvenile Court ............................. 762
1. The rehabilitative ideal ...................................................... 762
2. Jim Crow juvenile justice.................................................... 764
3. Progressive disillusion ........................................................ 765
C. In re Gault ................................................................................... 766
1. Procedural formality .......................................................... 766
2. Fundamental fairness ......................................................... 769
3. Paternalism and racial neutrality ...................................... 770
II. Race and Punishment in the Post-Gault Era..................................... 772
A. Procedural Formality and Institutional Convergence ........... 772
B. Fundamental Fairness and Illusory Protection ...................... 775
C. Rights, Politics, and Compensatory Punishment ................... 783
D. Racialized Juvenile Justice ........................................................ 786
III. Race, Rights, and Representation in the Juvenile Court ............... 791
A. Buttressing Gault ....................................................................... 792
B. A Critique of Procedural Rights ........................................... 794
C. Toward Substantive Reform ............................................... 796
1. Decriminalizing non-violent youthful behavior.......... 796

2020]

RACE, RIGHTS, & REPRESENTATION

745

2. Expanding diversion .................................................... 797
3. Constraining juvenile punishment .............................. 798
4. Reducing implicit racial bias ........................................ 802
Conclusion ........................................................................................... 802
INTRODUCTION
For the first two-thirds of the twentieth century, the juvenile court
avoided sustained judicial scrutiny. Established in 1899 by Progressive
reformers as a rehabilitative alternative to the criminal justice system,
the juvenile court was to “take [each child] in charge, not so much to
punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to
develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen.”1
Procedural protections were eschewed in favor of nearly unfettered
discretion, which, proponents believed, would best enable courts to
diagnose and treat each child’s delinquent behavior.2
By the 1920s, however, evidence was mounting that juvenile court
decision making was often arbitrary and its outcomes unduly harsh.3
Maltreatment was especially pronounced for Black4 children, who
were routinely denied the juvenile court’s promised solicitude and

1. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909).
2. Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MINN. L. REV. 691,
695 (1991).
3. See HERBERT H. LOU, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES 68 (1927).
4. Throughout this Article, the authors capitalize the word “Black” when it is
used to reference census-defined Black or African American people. In doing so, the
authors follow the lead of organizations such as the Brookings Institute, which
recently adopted what it calls “a long-overdue policy to properly recognize the
identity of Black Americans and other people of ethnic and indigenous descent in
[its] research and writings,” David Lanham & Amy Liu, Not Just a Typographical
Change: Why Brookings Is Capitalizing Black, BROOKINGS (Sept. 23, 2019),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/brookingscapitalizesblack [https://perma.cc/
3YYV-XE7R], and authors such as Kimberlé Crenshaw and Catharine MacKinnon,
who have long recognized the significance of capitalizing a term that denotes
cultural or ethnicity identity. See Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and
Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 H ARV . L.
R EV . 1331, 1332 n.2 (1988) (“When using ‘Black,’ I shall use an upper-case ‘B’ to
reflect my view that Blacks, like Asians, Latinos, and other ‘minorities,’ constitute a
specific cultural group and, as such, require denotation as a proper noun.”); Catharine
MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: An Agenda for Theory, 7 SIGNS: J.
WOMEN IN CULTURE & SOC’Y 515, 516 (1982) (noting that “Black” should not be regarded
“as merely a color of skin pigmentation, but as a heritage, an experience, a cultural and
personal identity”). Because the term “white” is generally used in this Article to
reference a socially constructed racial category and not a specific cultural or ethnic
identity, it is not capitalized.
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services in the North, and in the Jim Crow South, were “leased,”
whipped, imprisoned with adults, and executed.5 Yet, even as prominent
advocates and academics began to call for greater oversight and
accountability,6 the juvenile court continued to languish in a legal
backwater that insulated it from systematic examination.7
This changed abruptly with the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in
In re Gault.8 A component of the Warren Court’s reported efforts to
enhance procedural fairness, expand civil rights, and combat racial
injustice,9 Gault engrafted on to juvenile court proceedings a number
5. See JAMES BELL & LAURA JOHN RIDOLFI, W. HAYWOOD BURNS INST., ADORATION
QUESTION: REFLECTIONS ON THE FAILURE TO REDUCE RACIAL & ETHNIC
DISPARITIES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 3–4 (Shadi Rahimi ed., 2008),
https://www.burnsinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Adoration-of-theQuestion.pdf [https://perma.cc/95YQ-L6GR] (discussing imprisoned black children
being held with adults and “convict leasing”); GEOFF K. WARD, THE BLACK CHILDSAVERS: RACIAL DEMOCRACY & JUVENILE JUSTICE 111, 113–16 (2012) (discussing Black
children being disproportionately imprisoned with adults, whipped, and executed);
Miriam Stohs, Racism in the Juvenile Justice System: A Critical Perspective, 2 WHITTIER J.
CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 97, 100 (2003) (explaining that segregated prisons often forced
Black children to be housed in prisons meant for adults).
6. See, e.g., LOU, supra note 3, at 68 (acknowledging the dangers of unfettered
discretion and “arbitrary powers”); Roscoe Pound, Foreword to the First Edition of
PAULINE V. YOUNG, SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY, at xv (2d ed.
1952) (likening juvenile courts to the “Star Chamber”); Paul W. Tappan, Treatment
Without Trial, 24 SOC. FORCES 306, 307–08 (1946) (condemning juvenile courts as
“treatment without trial”); Matthew J. Beemsterboer, Note, The Juvenile Court—
Benevolence in the Star Chamber, 50 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POL. SCI. 464, 475 (1960)
(arguing that the juvenile court “is merely a euphemism for the star chamber”).
7. Courts rarely heard appeals from delinquency proceedings and legal scholars
failed to address juvenile courts’ systemic failures. Barry C. Feld, My Life in Crime: An
Intellectual History of the Juvenile Court, 17 NEV. L.J. 299, 303 (2017) (“[F]ew law schools
offered courses on juvenile justice because, prior to Gault there was no “law” of juvenile
justice. Generic state statutes creating juvenile courts provided vague substantive
goals—treatment and rehabilitation—and minimal procedural limitations on judges’
discretion. Psychology, criminology, and sociology departments focused more on
delinquency—why do adolescents commit crimes—than on justice administration—how
states process young offenders. Schools of social work focused primarily on intervention
and treatment rather than juvenile justice administration.” (footnote omitted)).
8. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
9. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and
the Conservative “Backlash”, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1484, 1494 (2003) (documenting
the Warren Court’s concern about racial inequality); Burt Neuborne, The
Gravitational Pull of Race on the Warren Court, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 59, 86 (2010) (noting
that the right to counsel cases were driven by concerns about racial inequity); David
Alan Sklansky, Police and Democracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1805 (2005) (arguing
that “criminal procedure in the Warren Court era was famously preoccupied with
issues of illegitimate inequality, particularly those associated with race”).
OF THE
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of the constitutional protections afforded adult defendants. “[H]istory
has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently
motivated, is frequently a poor substitute for principle and procedure,”
Justice Abe Fortas lamented.10 Chief among the rights conferred
upon juvenile defendants was “the guiding hand of counsel.”11 Gault
was hailed as revolutionary.12 “It will be known as the Magna Carta for
juveniles,” Chief Justice Warren exclaimed in a note to Fortas.13
Yet, if two of the Court’s main objectives in Gault were to improve
procedural fairness and address systemic racial disproportionality in the
juvenile court, it has not succeeded. In recognition of Gault’s 50th
Anniversary in 2017, a number of scholars and advocates have
documented the decision’s procedural shortfalls, exploring Gault’s legal
context,14 disappointing implementation,15 limited scope,16 and the role
10. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18.
11. Id. at 36 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)); see also Barry C.
Feld, Criminalizing Juvenile Justice: Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile Court, 69 MINN. L.
REV. 141, 185 n.146 (1984) (discussing the right to counsel in juvenile cases).
12. See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Alfred G. Walton, Parens Patriae and Statutory
Vagueness in the Juvenile Court, 82 YALE L.J. 745, 750 & n.36 (1973) (calling Gault
“revolutionary” (quoting Monrad Paulsen, Children’s Court: Gateway or Last Resort?, 10
COLUM. U.F. 4 (1967))); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective,
22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (1970) (predicting that Gault would yield “drastic
changes in the design and function of juvenile courts”); Murray M. Milton, PostGault: A New Prospectus for the Juvenile Court, 16 N.Y. L.F. 57, 59 (1970) (noting
support of Gault led to an upheaval in the juvenile court system).
13. DAVID S. TANENHAUS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN: In re Gault
AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 89 (2017).
14. See, e.g., Zawadi Baharanyi & Randy Hertz, The Many Stories of In re Gault, in
RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM: 50 YEARS OF CHILD ADVOCACY IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM 3, 4–5 (Kristin Henning et al. eds., 2018) (examining the Supreme Court’s
civil rights era juvenile justice jurisprudence and the background of Gerald Gault’s
counsel, Norman Dorsen); Ellen Marrus & Chris Phillis, Arizona Before and After In re
Gault: Has Arizona Realized the Promises of In re Gault?, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM,
supra, at 20, 22–25 (describing Arizona’s juvenile rights landscape both before and after
Gault); David S. Tanenhaus & Eric C. Nystrom, Pursuing Gault, 17 NEV. L.J. 351 (2017)
(tracing the decision’s impact on the evolution of constitutional jurisprudence and
historical accounts of the evolution of the juvenile court).
15. See NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., ACCESS DENIED: A NATIONAL SNAPSHOT OF
STATES’ FAILURE TO PROTECT CHILDREN’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL 10 (2017) (documenting
youths’ limited access to counsel in the juvenile court); Jay D. Blitzman, Gault’s Promise
Revisited: The Search for Due Process, 69 JUV. & FAM. CT. J. 49 (2018) (examining whether
Gault’s efforts to engraft due process protections into the juvenile court have been
realized); Laura Cohen, The Still-Elusive Promise of In re Gault, 32 CRIM. JUST. 57 (2018)
(arguing that the modern juvenile court does not fulfill Gault’s promise of counsel); see
also Katayoon Majd & Patricia Puritz, The Cost of Justice: How Low-Income Youth Continue to
Pay the Price of Failing Indigent Defense Systems, 16 GEO. J. POVERTY L. & POL’Y 543, 543 (2009)
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of the juvenile defender.17 This Article builds upon the work of the
smaller group of scholars who have contributed to what, until relatively
recently, was a limited account of race and the juvenile court,18
(examining the “structural, cultural, and systemic barriers that impede access to counsel
and quality of legal representation for low-income youth”).
16. See Laura Cohen & Sandra Simkins, No More “Desert Devil’s Island”: The Right to
Counsel for Incarcerated Children, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 227,
231–36 (arguing that Gault should extend to post-conviction); Casey McGowan et al.,
Moving Forward from Gault, CHAMPION, Apr. 2017, at 22, 24 (arguing that Gault should
extend to pre-trial proceedings); see also Sandra Simkins & Laura Cohen, The Critical
Role of Post-Disposition Representation in Addressing the Needs of Incarcerated Youth, 8 JOHN
MARSHALL L.J. 313 (2015) (arguing that “post-dispositional” legal representation for
youth in long-term custody is a constitutional requirement).
17. Nancy Ginsburg, Raising the Bar: Improving the Model of Defense Representation for
Adolescents Prosecuted in Adult Courts, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at
154, 156–65 (discussing the Legal Aid Society of New York Adolescent, Intervention
and Diversion Project’s (AID) approach to the representation of youth prosecuted as
adults); Kristin Henning & Erin Keith, Pride and Prejudice: Juvenile Defenders for Racial
Justice 50 Years After Gault, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 199
(chronicling the disparate treatment of non-white youth in the juvenile justice system
and urging juvenile defenders to explore the roles they may play both in
perpetuating disparities and promoting meaningful reform); Liz Ryan & Carmen
Daugherty, Gault at 50: What Juvenile Defenders Can Do to Dismantle the Youth Prison
Model, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 252 (describing the origins and
current features of the “youth prison model” and advocating for juvenile defenders
to play a role in their dismantling); Kristin Henning, Race, Paternalism, and the Right to
Counsel, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 649 (2017) (exploring the ways in which “implicit racial
bias contributes to paternalism and undermines zealous legal representation of
children in the juvenile justice system”).
18. Until Geoff Ward’s seminal account of the juvenile court’s racialized history,
THE BLACK CHILD-SAVERS, supra note 5, only a handful of scholars had explored the
evolution of the juvenile court through the prism of race. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, BAD
KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 162–65 (1999) (arguing
that procedural reforms helped to legitimate more punitive interventions); Sara Sun
Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice Reforms as Seen from
Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.—C.L. L. REV. 511, 525 (2009) (arguing that “the
Warren Court reforms have little to offer if the problem is—as critics charge—the
comparatively harsh treatment of [B]lack as opposed to white defendants”); Barry C.
Feld, Race and the Jurisprudence of Juvenile Justice: A Tale in Two Parts, 1950–2000, in
OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 122, 123 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard
eds., 2005) (arguing that “race has had two distinct and contradictory influences on
the juvenile court during the second half of the twentieth century”); Feld, supra note
9, at 1484, 1494 (discussing the Warren Court’s “perceived . . . need . . . to protect
minority offenders” and desire to make its own contribution to the civil rights
movement by “focus on procedural rights” as an answer to the country’s profound
“concern about racial inequality”); Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent
Behavior in Communities of Color: The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98
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documenting the juvenile court’s history of racially disparate treatment,19
Gault’s response,20 and the decision’s racial implications.21
We do not minimize the positive impact that Gault did have on
juvenile court proceedings: Gault initiated the regulation of juvenile
court decision making, subjected the juvenile court to badly needed
scrutiny, and most critically, gave children the right to be heard and
confront the evidence against them in delinquency proceedings. But
this Article argues that, to the extent Gault was also intended to
improve juvenile court outcomes for children of color, Gault has not
just failed; it may have made things worse in three respects.
First, Gault’s endorsement of a formal and adversarial court process
for children had the unintended effect of criminalizing both the
juvenile court and the children who came before it. During the 1970s
and 1980s, the juvenile court underwent an ideological, jurisprudential,
procedural, and jurisdictional transformation from a quasi-social welfare
agency focused on the “best interests” of the child to a second-class
CORNELL L. REV. 383 (2013) (arguing that contemporary narratives of Black and
Hispanic youth as dangerous and irredeemable lead prosecutors to
disproportionately reject youth as a mitigating factor for their delinquent behavior).
19. See Kristin Henning, The Challenge of Race and Crime in a Free Society: The Racial
Divide in Fifty Years of Juvenile Justice Reform, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1604, 1614, 1616–17
(2018) (discussing the racialized origins of the juvenile court and the disparate
treatment of non-white youth); see also WARD, supra note 5, at 105, 124 (documenting
Jim Crow juvenile justice and the role that Black reformers played in its dismantling
and the broader evolution of the American juvenile justice system); Tamar R.
Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the Defense Attorney, 58 B.C.
L. REV. 379 (2017) (calling for the diversification of the juvenile court bench and bar
to enhance fairness and combat the harms of historical and contemporary structural
racism); Kristin Henning et al., Toward Equal Recognition, Authority, and Protection:
Legal and Extra-Legal Advocacy for Black Youth in the Juvenile Justice System, in RIGHTS,
RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 30 (documenting the fight for racial equity in
the juvenile court in the years before and immediately after Gault).
20. Robin Walker Sterling, Fundamental Unfairness: In re Gault and the Road Not
Taken, 72 MD. L. REV. 607 (2013) (arguing that “if the Court had been more attentive
to the disparate treatment of [B]lack children in the juvenile justice system, then it
would have been more likely to root [Gault] in the Bill of Rights” as it had its other
criminal procedure reforms).
21. BARRY C. FELD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE JUVENILE COURT: RACE, POLITICS, AND
THE CRIMINALIZING OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 137–44 (2017); see also FELD, supra note 18, at
162–65 (arguing that procedural reforms helped to legitimate punishment that fell
disproportionately heavily on minority youth); Feld, supra note 9, at 1484, 1494
(discussing the Warren Court’s “perceived . . . need . . . to protect minority
offenders” and desire to make its own contribution to the civil rights movement by
“focus on procedural rights” as an answer to the country’s profound “concern about
racial inequality”); Sterling, supra note 20 (arguing that Gault exacerbated the
disparate treatment of youth of color).
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criminal court focused on the gravity of the child’s offense.22 By the
1990s, many states had formally redefined their juvenile courts’ purpose
clauses, processes, and facilities to deemphasize rehabilitation and
emphasize public safety and punishment.23
Second, even as Gault challenged the juvenile court’s compassion,
fairness, effectiveness, and constitutional vacuity, the Court nonetheless
declined to consider “the totality of the relationship of the juvenile and
the state”24 and opted instead for a ruling that was constitutionally tepid,
paternalistic, and race neutral. Rather than base Gault’s core protections
in the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as it had done for adult
criminal defendants in Gideon v. Wainwright,25 the Court relied on the
less rigorous Fourteenth Amendment “fundamental fairness”
requirement.26 It also declined to address whether Gault’s protections
should extend to the pre-judicial, dispositional, post-adjudicative, or
appellate stages of juvenile proceedings.27 The net result was a set of
constitutional protections that were comparatively weaker than those
granted criminal defendants. Studies conducted during the 1970s, 1980s,
and 1990s confirmed that, despite Gault’s mandates, juveniles in many
states remained unrepresented in delinquency proceedings.28 This
remains true today. Hundreds of thousands of children appear in juvenile
court each year without counsel, or with lawyers who are undertrained,
undersupervised, underpaid, and overworked.29
Gault’s constitutional timidity also set the stage for the Court’s
refusal in the decades following Gault to afford youth the full panoply
of constitutional rights it had granted adults. Just four years after
22. See FELD, supra note 18, at 162–65 (demonstrating the shift in juvenile rights and
explaining that in that context, “procedural reforms cannot compensate for the highly
discretionary substantive standards—‘best interests of the child’ or a ‘serious risk’ of future
crime—that preclude evenhanded enforcement and lend themselves to discriminatory
applications”); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of the Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 877 n.282 (1988).
23. See infra Section II.A.
24. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
25. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
26. Gault, 387 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring); CHRISTOPHER P. MANFREDI, THE
SUPREME COURT AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 125 (1998); see also Barry C. Feld, A Century of
Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189
(2007) (analyzing procedural deficiencies of juvenile courts); Feld, supra note 11
(comparing and contrasting delinquency and criminal procedural safeguards);
Sterling, supra note 20, at 633–38.
27. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 58.
28. See infra Section II.B.
29. FELD, supra note 21, at 246-48 (reporting that many, if not most, delinquents
appeared in juvenile court without counsel); NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., supra note 15, at 10.
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Gault, the Court held in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania30 that juvenile
defendants do not have the right to what is arguably the justice
system’s most important check on state power—trial by jury.31
Given the Warren Court’s reported concerns about the juvenile
court’s procedural vacuity and racial inequity, it is also remarkable
that the decision embraces elements of the “Child Savers’”
rehabilitation narrative and wholly avoids discussing race.32 Whether
this is a function of the Court’s efforts to justify its less rigorous
constitutional standard, a calculated compromise to avoid the type of
political fallout generated by its school desegregation cases, or the
Court’s less-than-complete commitment to racial equality in the
administration of criminal and juvenile justice, Gault’s failure to
reject outright the juvenile court’s paternalistic and discriminatory
history left a “significant gap in the fight for racial equality in the
juvenile justice system.”33
Finally, one of Gault’s tragic ironies is that even its tepid expansion
of juvenile court rights was enough to trigger a political backlash that
legitimated a series of increasingly punitive juvenile laws and
policies.34 As violent youth crime rates spiked in the late 1970s and
1980s, calls to “get tough” on juvenile defendants reverberated across
the country. Branding adolescent lawbreakers “super-predators,”35
nearly every state in the country enacted laws making it easier to
prosecute children as adults, expanding criminal court jurisdiction
30. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
31. Id. at 545.
32. See, e.g., ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY
3–4 (1969) (“The child savers viewed themselves as altruists and humanitarians
dedicated to rescuing those who were less fortunately placed in the social order . . . .
The child savers went beyond mere humanitarian reforms of existing institutions.
They brought attention to—and, in doing so, invented—new categories of youthful
misbehavior which had been hitherto unappreciated.”). The child savers who
founded the Cook County, Illinois juvenile court were upper and upper-middle class
women who extended their traditional domestic roles as child-rearers, caretakers,
and carriers of moral virtue into the public realm. Id. at 75–78; see also FELD, supra
note 18, at 31–42 (describing the role of women during the Progressive era in
fostering compulsory education, child labor, and juvenile court reforms to construct
the new legal institutions of childhood).
33. Henning et al., supra note 19, at 33.
34. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 22, at 826–28; Feld, supra note 9, at 1484, 1494.
35. John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, WKLY. STANDARD, Nov. 25,
1995, at 25–26; see also Gene Koprowski, The Rise of the Teen Super-Predator, WASH.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A17 (explaining that “drug use and violence among ‘superpredators’ are actually caused by moral poverty—that is, the poverty of growing up
without a loving, responsible parent who can teach right from wrong”).
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over juvenile cases, weakening confidentiality laws, toughening gang
laws, and imposing mandatory minimum sentences.36 The number of
juveniles confined in adult jails and prisons soared.37
All of these developments hit Black children the hardest. Though
racial disparities in arrest, charging, detention, disposition, and adult
court transfer had long been present in the juvenile justice system,
they spiked in the 1980s and 1990s.38 By the late 1990s, Black youth
made up 15% of those under eighteen in this country, but nearly
60% of the youth sentenced to adult prisons.39 The numbers remain
bleak today.40 There is also evidence that children of color are

36. See PATRICIA TORBET & LINDA SZYMANSKI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 1996–97 UPDATE (1998),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172835.pdf [https://perma.cc/8PZ4-QCVK]; Barry
C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24 CRIME &
JUST. 189 (1998); Franklin E. Zimring, The 1990s Assault on Juvenile Justice: Notes from
an Ideological Battleground, 11 FED. SENT’G REP. 260, 260 (1999).
37. According to the National Council on Crime and Delinquency, the number
of youth incarcerated in adult jails increased by 208% between 1990 and 2004.
CHRISTOPHER HARTNEY, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME & DELINQUENCY, FACT SHEET:
YOUTH UNDER AGE 18 IN THE ADULT CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 3 (2006),
http://nccdglobal.org/sites/default/files/publication_pdf/factsheet-youth-inadult-system.pdf [https://perma.cc/2ERJ-XHSA]; see also FELD, supra note 21, at
132–44 (2017) (describing various indicators of greater punitiveness in juvenile
court sentencing and disparate impact on youths of color); ASHLEY NELLIS, A
RETURN TO JUSTICE: RETHINKING OUR APPROACH TO JUVENILES IN THE SYSTEM 51
(2016); MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 73, 75
(2011) (discussing mandatory sentencing laws and how they bring about racial
disparities in the prison system).
38. See, e.g., ELEANOR HINTON HOYTT ET AL., 8 PATHWAYS TO JUVENILE DETENTION
REFORM: REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN JUVENILE DETENTION 10 (2001),
http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/reducing_race.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G4VV-98E7] (documenting the significant increases in racial
disproportionality in juvenile detention facilities during the 1990s); JOLANTA
JUSZKIEWICZ, YOUTH CRIME/ADULT TIME: IS JUSTICE SERVED? (2000),
http://www.njjn.org/uploads/digital-library/resource_127.pdf [https://perma.cc/
A44J-U42W] (providing a study of more than 2500 cases filed in eighteen of the
largest jurisdictions in the country demonstrated that Black youth were
disproportionately charged in adult court and were more likely than white or Latino
youth to receive a sentence of incarceration).
39. EILEEN POE-YAMAGATA & MICHAEL A. JONES, NAT’L COUNCIL ON CRIME &
DELINQUENCY, AND JUSTICE FOR SOME: DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT OF YOUTH OF COLOR IN
THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 28 (2000), https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED442882 [https://
perma.cc/NQ4S-J5S4].
40. FELD, supra note 21, at 112 (“In the seventy-five largest counties in the United
States, racial minorities comprised more than two-thirds of juveniles tried in criminal
court and the vast majority of those sentenced to prison.”).
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disproportionately denied access to counsel and other basic due
process protections in the juvenile court.41
We do not claim, of course, that Gault was solely or even primarily
responsible for these developments in the juvenile court. But we argue
that, to the extent Gault’s procedural rights framework was intended to
serve as a panacea for systemic racial disproportionality in the juvenile
court, the Warren Court’s seminal juvenile justice decision was as
misguided as many of its constitutional criminal procedure decisions.
The primary sources of racial injustice in the juvenile court were then
what they continue to be today: the over-criminalization, over-policing,
and over-punishment of juveniles of color;42 the pervasiveness of longstanding “narratives casting [Black youth] as violent, immoral,
degenerate, and undeserving of child welfare and social services”;43 and
the presence of overt and implicit racial biases that drive juvenile
court decision makers to invoke these narratives when they assess the
youth who come before them.44 As important as procedural rights
41. Mary Ann Scali, Being David: The Future of Juvenile Defense and the Goliath of
Youth Injustice, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 187, 188-89
(documenting recent Department of Justice efforts in Memphis, Georgia, and St.
Louis to ensure legal representation for juvenile defendants of color). See generally
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 84-85 (2012) (stating that every year tens of thousands of poor
defendants go to jail without seeing a lawyer); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE
AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 63-65, 71, 94 (1999) (explaining
the inadequacies of Gideon); Rebecca Marcus, Note, Racism in Our Courts: The
Underfunding of Public Defenders and Its Disproportionate Impact Upon Racial Minorities, 22
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 219, 219-20, 223 (1994) (arguing that underfunding of public
defender offices results violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel).
42. FELD, supra note 21, at 137–44; see also Donna M. Bishop & Michael J. Leiber,
Racial and Ethnic Differences in Delinquency and Justice System Responses, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 445, 445 (Barry C. Feld & Donna
M. Bishop eds., 2012); Donna M. Bishop, The Role of Race and Ethnicity in Juvenile
Justice Processing, in OUR CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC
DIFFERENCES IN AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 23, 23 (Darnell F. Hawkins & Kimberly
Kempf-Leonard eds., 2005).
43. Henning et al., supra note 19, at 31. See generally KHALIL GIBRAN MUHAMMAD,
THE CONDEMNATION OF BLACKNESS: RACE, CRIME, AND THE MAKING OF MODERN URBAN
AMERICA (2010).
44. See George S. Bridges & Sara Steen, Racial Disparities in Official Assessments of
Juvenile Offenders: Attributional Stereotypes as Mediating Mechanisms, 63 AM. SOC. REV.
554, 567 (1998) (stating that court officials rely on internal attributes rather than
severity of crime or criminal history); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming
Unconscious Racial Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 499
(2004) (explaining that disparities in sentencing may be attributable to implicit
racial bias and stereotypes).
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may be to institutional fairness and accuracy, even the presence of
the best-trained, best-funded defense lawyers cannot overcome these
systemic inequities and pervasive stereotypes. Instead, we argue these
substantive inequities require substantive policy reforms.
Part I traces the social, political, and legal contexts within which the
Warren Court’s constitutional criminal procedure jurisprudence
emerged, beginning with the Great Migration of Black southerners
from the rural South to the northern and western United States,
through the early Civil Rights Movement, and culminating in the
Supreme Court’s efforts to redress racial injustice through the
expansion of procedural rights.45 It then traces the evolution of the
American juvenile court over the same period with a focus on the
nascent system’s paternalistic orientation and its disparate treatment
of Black youth. Part I concludes with a dissection of Gault itself.
Part II makes the case that, in an effort to alleviate the juvenile
court’s racial inequities, the Court unwittingly compounded them. We
argue that infusing the juvenile court with some, but not all, of the
criminal procedural rights afforded adults and failing to confront
directly the juvenile court’s paternalistic and racially discriminatory
history, triggered the juvenile court’s ideological, jurisprudential,
procedural, and jurisdictional transformation into a second-class
criminal court for youth that meted out punishment without the
protection of its criminal counterpart. It also legitimated a political
backlash that led to exceptionally punitive juvenile laws and policies.
Youth of color bore the brunt of these changes.
Finally, Part III is prescriptive. Triggered by a series of recent Supreme
Court decisions recognizing that children are constitutionally different
from adults for purposes of punishment, the juvenile court is once again
at a pivotal moment. As legislatures and courts across the country
contemplate reform,46 Gault’s racial legacy is instructive. While we agree
that shoring up the procedural protections that do exist in the juvenile

45. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); NICHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED
LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND HOW IT CHANGED AMERICA (1991); WARD,
supra note 5, at 165; Sterling, supra note 20, at 631–34; Joe William Trotter, Jr.,
Introduction to THE GREAT MIGRATION IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: NEW DIMENSIONS OF
RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER (Joe William Trotter, Jr. ed., 1991).
46. See, e.g., CONG. RES. SERV., R45558, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018: AN OVERVIEW
10, 12, 13, 21 (2019) (stating that the First Step Act provides more procedural
safeguards for juveniles in the justice system); JUST. POL’Y INST., RAISE THE AGE 2, 4
(2017) (discussing state legislatures’ decision to raise the age requirement for being
in adult court).
AND THE
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court remains an important mission, we also contend that reformers—
and especially those focused on racial equity—should not lose sight of
the forest for the trees. Improving outcomes for juvenile defendants of
color will be best achieved both through added procedural protections
and especially through substantive policy reforms such as the legalization
of non-violent adolescent behavior and status offenses, alteration of
policing policies and increased opportunities for diversion away from the
juvenile court, mitigated punishment for youths in juvenile and criminal
courts, and measures to reduce implicit racial bias.
I. RACE AND THE ROAD TO GAULT
The traditional narrative about the Warren Court’s 1967 decision
in In re Gault is that it was a decision driven by the judiciary’s growing
disillusion with Progressivism, the rehabilitative ideal, and the
benevolence of the State.47 While this is true, Gault, like many of the
Warren Court’s constitutional criminal procedure decisions, was also
animated by concerns about racial injustice. Issued at the end of the
Great Migration, in the heart of the Civil Rights Movement, and in the
shadow of the Court’s seminal decision in Brown v. Board of Education,48
Gault was a component of the Court’s broader efforts to promote
racial equality through the expansion of civil rights and due process.
Curiously, however, the decision itself says nothing about race.
A. Race, Civil Rights, and the Supreme Court
The Great Migration of Black Americans from southern states to
the northern and western United States during the first two-thirds of
the twentieth century profoundly changed American society, politics,
and law. These sociopolitical and legal reverberations were critical
components of the Court’s decision in Gault.
1.

The Great Migration
The Great Migration began shortly after the turn of twentieth
century and took place over the course of three distinct waves. Drawn
by enhanced employment, education, and housing opportunities,
and looking to leave behind the Jim Crow laws, extreme segregation,
overt racial hostility, and white vigilante violence of the rural South,
more than a million Black Americans left the South in the years after

47. See generally FELD, supra note 21.
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1953).
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World War I in what would become the first wave of migration.49 The
country’s entry into World War II, a boom in war production
industries, widespread labor shortages, and an increased willingness
by defense contractors to hire Black workers induced a second wave
in the 1930s and 1940s,50 and a final wave of nearly five million Black
Americans took place between the end of World War II and 1960.51
The extent of the demographic shift was extraordinary: in 1910, 90%
of Black Americans lived in southern states; by 1960, just 50% did.52
The majority of Black southerners migrated to urban areas in the
North and the West.53 What they encountered, however, can hardly
be described as hospitable. While the infamous “Red Summer” of
1919, in which white mobs laid siege to Black communities
throughout both the South and North, was the most overt and violent
manifestation of northern white resistance,54 racial discrimination
permeated daily life. As Black populations in northern cities began to
grow in the years after World War II, white people flocked to the
suburbs.55 The combination of federal housing and highway policies
further contributed to “white flight” and served to isolate Black
residents within the major cities.56 During the 1950s and 1960s, urban
planners fortified residential racial segregation in northern cities by
consciously locating public housing projects in urban areas and
steering Black families in their direction.57 Yet, the Great Migration
also placed the issue of racial inequality on the national political
agenda, confronted the racist ideology of segregation, and contested

49. ALEXANDER, supra note 41, at 30–40; FELD, supra note 18, at 84; KLARMAN,
supra note 45, at 100; LEMANN, supra note 45, at 15; DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A.
DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 28–
29 (1993); ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS: THE EPIC STORY OF
AMERICA’S GREAT MIGRATION 9, 533–34 (2010).
50. FELD, supra note 18, at 83–85; cf. LEMANN, supra note 45, at 21.
51. Cf. MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POVERTY TO
THE WAR ON WELFARE 131 (1989); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 49, at 18.
52. Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV.
881, 898 (1998).
53. In 1870, 80% of Black Americans lived in the rural south; by 1970, 80%
resided in cities, half in the North, Midwest, and West. See MARTIN GILENS, WHY
AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTI-POVERTY POLICY
104–05 (1999); MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 49, at 18; WARD, supra note 5, at 107.
54. Genna Rae McNeil, Before Brown: Reflections on Historical Context and Vision, 52
AM. U. L. REV. 1431, 1435–36 (2003).
55. KATZ, supra note 51, at 133–37; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 49, at 45, 49–52.
56. KATZ, supra note 51, at 134–35; MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 49, at 45–46.
57. Feld, supra note 9, at 1513 & n.288.
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the social construction of racial inferiority,58 which set the stage for
the emergence of the Civil Rights Movement.59
2.

The emerging Civil Rights Movement
Even as much of the United States enjoyed post-War affluence and
growth, Black Americans continued to endure laws and policies that
sabotaged their economic, educational, and social mobility. During the
1940s and 1950s, however, resistance began to mount. As Black
Americans acquired better jobs, higher incomes, and resources with
which to challenge the racial status quo, a more assertive civil rights
movement began to emerge to confront the overtly racist Jim Crow
ideology of the South and the more passive racial hostility of the North.60
As Black northerners became a more potent political force in key
states, the constituencies of the respective political parties began to
reconfigure.61 Divisions within the Democratic Party—between racial
and social policy liberals and conservatives, and between northerners
and southerners—emerged.62 In 1948, the Democratic Party convention
platform for the first time included a strong civil rights plank.63 In
reaction, then-Democrat South Carolina Governor Strom Thurmond
left the party, ran for president on the States Rights Party—the
“Dixiecrats”—and foretold the political realignment of the South.64
In the 1950s, duly enacted Jim Crow laws forced Black southerners
to attend segregated schools, ride segregated buses, use segregated
bathrooms, eat at segregated restaurants, and stay at segregated
hotels.65 Black Americans were also systematically disenfranchised

58. KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 100, 107–08.
59. Feld, supra note 9, at 1461–62.
60. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
FROM THE 1960S TO THE 1990S 98 (2d ed. 1994).
61. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 44–45 (2000);
see also KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 100–01.
62. KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 111, 114.
63. KATHERINE BECKETT, MAKING CRIME PAY: LAW AND ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN POLITICS 40 (1997); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN
REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS 33 (1991);
KLARMAN, supra note 42, at 180–81; OMI & WINANT, supra note 57, at 98.
64. BECKETT, supra note 63, at 40; EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 63, at 34.
65. GILENS, supra note 53, at 107. See generally WILKERSON, supra note 49.
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and excluded from juries.66 Violent extra-legal terrorism reinforced
racial domination and subordination.67
Yet, conservative southern Democrats in Congress forcefully resisted
anti-discrimination laws, voting rights laws, open housing laws, federal
aid to education, and national health insurance.68 Because a number
of these were long-serving Democrats who chaired pivotal
congressional committees, they were able to block laws aimed at
reducing racial inequality.69
3.

“Discrete and insular minorities”
As the Civil Rights Movement was emerging, the Supreme Court
was forced by legislative default to fill the policy void. In 1896, the
Court had held in Plessy v. Ferguson70 that “separate but equal”
facilities did not deny Black Americans equal protection of the law
and remitted racial issues to the states.71 For the next half-century,
Plessy provided the constitutional foundation for segregated public
facilities and Jim Crow laws.72
The Great Migration increased the visibility of racial discrimination
and highlighted the magnitude of America’s racial dilemma.73 Racial
segregation and legally enforced inequality were grounded in
historical theories of racial inferiority that conflicted with American
ideals of democracy, equality, and justice. Many legislators and jurists
believed that resolving this hypocrisy required racial integration.74
During the 1937 to 1938 Term, the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of New Deal laws and distinguished the scope of review
it would apply to economic legislation—where it gave Congress and
states broad regulatory authority—from its scrutiny of laws that
affected individual rights. In the famous Footnote Four of United States

66. ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
UNEQUAL 17–18 (1992); Thomas Ward Frampton, The Jim Crow Jury, 71. VAND. L. REV.
1593, 1595 (2018).
67. HACKER, supra note 66, at 17–18; see, e.g., Frampton, supra note 66, at 1613–14
(discussing Southern views of extralegal violence in relation to the criminal justice system).
68. See FELD, supra note 18, at 87.
69. FELD, supra note 18, at 87; LEMANN, supra note 45, at 111.
70. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
71. Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting); KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 17–28.
72. See KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 10–13.
73. See ALEXANDER, supra note 41, at 35–36; LEMANN, supra note 45, at 7; GUNNAR
MYRDAL, 1 AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY
191–92 (1996).
74. See MYRDAL, supra note 73, at 1008–11.
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v. Carolene Products,75 the Court announced that it would review more
closely state laws that affected political rights and those protections
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.76 The Court proposed using the Equal
Protection Clause to strictly scrutinize laws that affected the political
process and racial minorities—“discrete and insular minorities”77—whose
rights might suffer continually from majoritarian domination.78
4.

The Warren Court
In 1953, Earl Warren became Chief Justice of the Court and
quickly began a campaign to end de jure segregation.79 The National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP)
battled segregation on many fronts, but the most crucial fight was to
desegregate schools.80 In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education, the
Warren Court concluded that separate no longer could be equal.81
Although Brown ordered states to desegregate schools with “all
deliberate speed,” southern political leaders denigrated the Court’s
decision and urged “massive resistance” to judicial usurpation.82 In the
aftermath of Brown, southern racial moderates virtually disappeared as
southern politics moved even farther to the right.83 Southern resistance
to desegregation in the 1950s, Senator Barry Goldwater’s Republican
presidential campaign in 1964, and George Wallace and Richard
Nixon’s presidential campaigns in 1968 demonstrated the political

75. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
76. Id. at 152 n.4.
77. Id. at 152–53 n.4 (“Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations [of
deference] enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or
racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political
processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.” (internal citations omitted)).
78. See KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 195–96; POWE, supra note 61, at 214–15; Robert
M. Cover, The Origins of Judicial Activism in the Protection of Minorities, 91 YALE L.J. 1287,
1300 (1982).
79. POWE, supra note 61, at 490–91.
80. FELD, supra note 21, at 52–54.
81. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); see also KLARMAN, supra note
45, at 292–312 (reconstructing the deliberations between the justices during the
Brown decision and discussing the internal decision-making of the Court).
82. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955); The Honorable Linwood
Holton, A Former Governor’s Reflection on Massive Resistance in Virginia, 49 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 15, 19–20 (1992).
83. KLARMAN, supra note 45, at 343.
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salience of a racialized Southern Strategy.84 Nonetheless, Brown provided
strong impetus to pursue other avenues of racial justice.
By the early 1960s, the Civil Rights Movement was generating
political momentum. Nationally televised violent attacks on Black
protesters and Freedom Riders led Congress to pass the Civil Rights
Act of 1964,85 banning discrimination in schools, employment, and
public accommodations, and the Voting Rights Act of 1965,86
prohibiting procedures designed to impede Black voters’ exercise of
the franchise.87 The laws created a national norm—formal legal
equality—on matters of race to which 70% of the members of Congress
and the unanimous Supreme Court required the South to conform.
Concomitant with the Warren Court’s efforts to enforce equality
norms was its attempt to address racial injustice in the criminal justice
system.88 Beginning in the 1920s and 1930s, Supreme Court cases like
Moore v. Dempsey,89 Powell v. Alabama,90 and Brown v. Mississippi91
sporadically used the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to
review states’ systems of criminal justice administration and protect
Black Americans against southern injustice.92 Those early decisions
involved egregious injustices—confessions extracted by torture, mobdominated proceedings, sham trials, and the death penalty.93 The
Court’s oversight of southern states’ criminal proceedings became
especially important in cases that challenged white supremacy or that
heightened national visibility of the injustices endured by Black

84. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 63, at 76–79; POWE, supra note 61, at 60–62.
85. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 and 42 U.S.C.).
86. Pub. L. No. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
52 U.S.C.).
87. See GILENS, supra note 53, at 108; POWE, supra note 61, at 260.
88. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 107 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014).
89. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
90. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
91. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
92. Brown, 297 U.S. at 286 (exclusion of coerced confessions extracted by
torture); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 597–99 (1935) (exclusion of Black jurors
from venire); Powell, 287 U.S. at 71 (“Scottsboro Boys” case using Fourteenth
Amendment due process clause to grant limited right to counsel); Moore, 261 U.S. at
86 (1923) (state criminal conviction obtained through mob-dominated sham trials);
DAN T. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO: A TRAGEDY OF THE AMERICAN SOUTH 161 (2007).
93. Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 377 (2001).
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defendants and marked its initial efforts to eradicate regional
deviation from elementary procedural expectations.94
During Warren’s tenure as Chief Justice, the Court decided close to
600 criminal cases.95 Several themes animated its jurisprudence: an
emphasis on individual liberty and equality, distrust of state power, an
unwillingness to rely on officials’ benevolent motives, and recognition
that discretionary decisions in the administration of justice adversely
affected racial minorities.96 The Court used three strategies—
incorporation, reinterpretation, and equal protection—to decide
state criminal procedure cases.97 First, it used the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause to incorporate specific provisions of
the Bill of Rights and apply them to the states, which allowed the
Court to establish a minimum requirement of fairness in criminal
trials.98 Second, it reinterpreted those provisions broadly to expand
constitutional rights and exercise greater oversight over state
officials.99 Finally, it used the Equal Protection Clause to redress
imbalances between white and non-white and rich and poor
defendants in states’ criminal justice systems.100
Decisions such as Mapp v. Ohio,101 establishing the exclusionary
rule, and Miranda v. Arizona,102 mandating warning prior to custodial
interrogation, expanded defendants’ rights, restricted police power,
and provided a remedy for constitutional violations. These decisions
elicited hostile criticism from law enforcement officials, conservative
politicians, and the public.103 While earlier criminal decisions like
Powell, Moore, and Brown involved egregious injustice and veiled
94. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99
MICH. L. REV. 48, 48, 71, 75 (2000).
95. Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the
Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 519.
96. See generally FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INFLICTED WOUND (1970); EDSALL &
EDSALL, supra note 63, at 110–11.
97. GRAHAM, supra note 96, at 41–66; G. Edward White, Warren Court (1953–
1969), in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 279, 287 (Leonard W. Levy et al. eds.,
1989); Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the Warren
Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1319, 1324–27 (1977).
98. See POWE, supra note 61, at 412.
99. See David Cuban, The Warren Court and the Concept of a Right, 34 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 7, 27 (1999) (discussing the Warren Court’s creation of rights as a
reaction to institutional threats that infringe on individual rights).
100. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (using Equal Protection
rationale to provide indigent appellants with a trial transcript).
101. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
102. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
103. See EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 63, at 111.
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discussions of race, by the mid-1960s, many whites viewed the Court’s
decisions as overtly racial because of their concurrence with urban
conflicts and rising crime rates.104
Yet, it is notable that the signature cases of the Warren Court’s
criminal procedure revolution contain virtually no discussion of
racial issues.105 Even Duncan v. Louisiana,106 which involved a Black
defendant who was sentenced to sixty days in jail for touching a white
youth on the arm as the defendant attempted to prevent a fight, held
that the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury applied to defendants
in state proceedings without mentioning the underlying racial
components of the case.107
B. Race, Paternalism, and the Juvenile Court
In parallel with the Great Migration and the emerging Civil Rights
Movement, the American juvenile court became a fixture in all fifty
states. Despite its nominally benevolent purposes, however, it quickly
became evident that juvenile court decisions were often arbitrary and
harsh, especially for Black children. By the 1960s, disillusionment
with the juvenile court’s unbridled discretion and lack of procedural
safeguards became widespread.
1.

The rehabilitative ideal
The nation’s first juvenile court was established in Cook County,
Illinois in 1899, a decade before the start of the Great Migration.108
Prompted by the prevailing Progressive philosophy that children were
vulnerable and dependent beings in need of special care and
protection, the juvenile justice system was created as a social welfare
alternative to the criminal justice system.109 The juvenile court
eschewed criminal elements, characterized its proceedings as civil,
104. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S.
42, 71 (1932); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note
63, at 74–77; GILENS, supra note 53, at 107–10.
105. Beale, supra note 18, at 527.
106. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
107. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 146, 147, 162. See generally Nancy J. King, Duncan v.
Louisiana: How Bigotry in the Bayou Led to the Federal Regulation of State Juries, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 272 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006).
108. See C. Antoinette Clarke, The Baby and the Bathwater: Adolescent Offending and
Punitive Juvenile Justice Reform, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 659, 667 (2005).
109. See FELD, supra note 18, at 60–67; see also Clarke, supra note 108, at 662–65
(observing that the Progressives’ approach to juvenile delinquency represented a
departure from the Colonial belief that parents and educators “were free to use
whatever means they deemed appropriate to correct misbehaving children”).
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and replaced lawyers and juries with social service personnel,
probation officers, and clinicians.110 Courtroom vocabulary shifted
accordingly: a petition in the welfare of the child commenced a
proceeding rather than a criminal charge; judges adjudicated a youth
to be delinquent rather than criminal; and they imposed dispositions
rather than sentences.111 Court proceedings abandoned formal rules
of evidence and procedure in favor of broad judicial discretion.112
Maximum flexibility and informality, it was thought, would best
enable the states to carry out their role as parens patriae.113
From its Progressive origins until the early 1970s, the Rehabilitative
Ideal emphasized treatment to promote juveniles’ well-being and
provided the intellectual framework, cultural vocabulary, and shared
understandings that animated criminal and juvenile justice
professionals.114 The rehabilitative enterprise focused on the
individual child and relied on judges and professionals to make
welfare-oriented decisions in the child’s “best interests.”115 While
traditional accounts of the juvenile court’s early years attribute
benevolent motives to its founders, most modern accounts portray
Progressives as wealthy Anglo-Protestants who envisioned the juvenile
court as a vehicle through which to exercise social control over Black
and immigrant youth.116

110. See FELD, supra note 18, at 62, 68–69; Feld, supra note 9, at 1458–59.
111. See FELD, supra note 18, at 68.
112. See Clarke, supra note 108, at 668 (noting that “courts were given maximum
discretion to allow for flexibility in diagnosis and treatment”).
113. See FELD, supra note 18, at 52 (noting that parens patriae, a legal doctrine with
origins in English chancery courts to protect the Crown’s interests in feudal
succession, provided the rationale for the state to substitute its own control over
children if their parents failed to meet their responsibilities); Neil Howard Cogan,
Juvenile Law, Before and After the Entrance of “Parens Patriae”, 22 S.C. L. REV. 147, 147
(1970); George B. Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or
Tyrant?, 25 DEPAUL L. REV. 895, 895 (1976); Douglas R. Rendleman, Parens Patriae:
From Chancery to the Juvenile Court, 23 S.C. L. REV. 205, 205 (1971).
114. DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 27 (2001).
115. DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA 53–61 (1980); FRANCIS A. ALLEN, Legal Values
and the Rehabilitative Ideal, in THE BORDERLAND OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE: ESSAYS IN LAW
AND CRIMINOLOGY 25, 26–29, 35–39, 41 (1964).
116. See, e.g., Henning et al., supra note 19, at 30, 32–34 (documenting the fight
for racial equity in the juvenile court in the years before and immediately after
Gault); ANTHONY PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY 3, 6, 10–
11, 13 (2d ed. 1977).
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2.

Jim Crow juvenile justice
From its earliest days, Black children were overpunished and
underserved in the juvenile court.117 Northern Progressive reformers
were simply not focused on the rehabilitation of “Negro” youth,
Geoff Ward notes.118 Black youth were a “perennial ‘lost cause[]’ . . .
lacking the physical, moral, and intellectual capacity on which
normalization would depend.”119
In Chicago’s nascent juvenile court, data suggests that while Black
and white children committed similar offenses, Black youth were sent
to the more punitive state-run reformatory, St. Charles School for
Boys, “sooner than [they] would have in the cases of Jewish, Italian,
or Polish children.”120 Within child welfare facilities and correctional
institutions, racial segregation was pervasive. Black children were
routinely excluded from refuge homes in northern cities, and those
that did allow Black youth, often relegated them to the “colored
section.”121 While white youth in juvenile court placements received
academic instruction and vocational training, Black children received
little, if any, education and were trained exclusively for manual labor
or low-level service jobs.122
In the Jim Crow South, Black youth fared far worse. “Southern
governments were generally slow to embrace juvenile justice reforms
and were especially disinclined to recognize [B]lack youths or
community interests in citizen-building narratives, during or after
slavery.”123 Most southern states tried Black children in criminal
courts, committed them to prisons, subjected them to chain gangs,
and leased them as “convicts.”124 In 1910, over 80% of Black youths
charged with offenses in the South were committed to adult
correctional facilities.125
By the 1960s, racial disparities in the juvenile court became part of
the national dialogue. A survey conducted contemporaneously with
Gault by the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the
117. Sterling, supra note 20, at 627–28.
118. See WARD, supra note 5, at 113-14.
119. Id. at 39.
120. Tamar R. Birckhead, The Racialization of Juvenile Justice and the Role of the
Defense Attorney, 58 B.C. L. REV. 379, 400 (2017) (quoting DAVID S. TANENHAUS,
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 38 (2004)).
121. WARD, supra note 5, at 53.
122. Id. at 52–53.
123. Id. at 60.
124. Id. at 11.
125. Id. at 98.
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Administration of Justice reported that in the vast majority of juvenile
courts in the country, non-white juveniles comprised 40% of the
youth who came before them.126 Separate studies found that Black
youth brought before the juvenile court were younger, had fewer
prior appearances, committed fewer and less serious crimes, but
received probation less often than their white counterparts.127
3.

Progressive disillusion
By the 1920s, the juvenile court’s absence of procedural protections was
raising concern among advocates and academics. In 1913, Roscoe
Pound lamented that “the powers of the Star Chamber were a
bagatelle” compared to the juvenile courts,128 a phrase that was
repeated by Professor Herbert Lou a decade later.129 In 1946, Paul
Tappan condemned the juvenile courts as “treatment without
trial.”130 Despite these calls for reform, juvenile courts evaded serious
scrutiny until the 1960s.131
In 1964, Chief Justice Earl Warren addressed the National Council
of Juvenile Court Judges and identified several procedural
protections that juvenile courts lacked—lawyers, a fair hearing, and a
framework of law to provide a check on unbridled caprice.132 In 1966,
the Warren Court stepped in for the first time, holding in Kent v.
United States133 that juvenile courts must provide procedural
safeguards in transfer hearings.134 “There is evidence, in fact, that
there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of
126. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT:
JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 80 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
127. See, e.g., Sidney Axelrad, Negro and White Male Institutionalized Delinquents, 57
AM. J. SOC. 569, 569–71 (1952); Sterling, supra note 20, at 632–33.
128. Roscoe Pound, The Administration of Justice in a Modern City, 26 HARV. L. REV.
302, 322 (1913).
129. LOU, supra note 3, at 68 (quoting Pound, supra note 128, at 322).
130. Tappan, supra note 6, at 307–08; see also Beemsterboer, supra note 6, at 475
(arguing that the juvenile court when it relies on informal observations “is merely a
euphemism for the star chamber”).
131. NELLIS, supra note 37, at 21; PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 55 (1967); TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 126, at 1; Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile Court and the Adversary System:
Problems of Function and Form, 1965 WIS. L. REV. 7, 12–26 (1965); Monrad G. Paulsen,
The Constitutional Domestication of the Juvenile Court, 1967 SUP. CT. REV. 233, 233; David
R. Barrett et al., Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized
Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 775–76 (1966).
132. FELD, supra note 18, at 99.
133. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
134. Id. at 556–57; Paulsen, supra note 131, at 252.
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both worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults
nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for
children,” the Court lamented.135
At the same time, the politics of race and crime were precipitating
a shift in criminal justice policies from the belief that penal measures
should rehabilitate and promote positive change to an increasingly
punitive orientation.136 Liberal critics continued to characterize
individualized treatment in the juvenile court as a paternalistic veneer
that masked coercive social control and oppressed the poor, the young,
and minorities.137 They also criticized judges and social workers whose
discretionary decisions resulted in unequal treatment of similarly
situated defendants and questioned the State’s ability to deal justly with
its most vulnerable citizens.138 Conservative critics perceived a crisis in
rising crime rates, civil rights protests, and urban race rebellions;
advocated for law and order; and favored repression over
rehabilitation.139 These developments laid the groundwork for Gault.
C. In re Gault
In re Gault was reportedly a product of the Warren Court’s efforts
to enhance the juvenile court’s procedural safeguards and curb what
had become overwhelming evidence of racial injustice. Curiously,
however, the Gault Court said nothing about race. Nor did it fully
reject the juvenile court’s Progressive origins.
1.

Procedural formality
The underlying facts of In re Gault were central to the Court’s
decision. In 1964, police in Globe, Arizona took a white fifteen-yearold named Gerald Gault into custody for allegedly making a
telephone call of the “irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex variety.”140
Police held him overnight without notifying his parents, and the next
day, a juvenile court judge held an informal hearing to consider a

135. Kent, 383 U.S. at 556.
136. FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 25–30 (1981); GARLAND, supra note 114, at 13; MARIE
GOTTSCHALK, CAUGHT: THE PRISON STATE AND THE LOCKDOWN OF AMERICAN POLITICS
146 (2015).
137. GARLAND, supra note 114, at 55.
138. ALLEN, supra note 136, at 87–88; GARLAND, supra note 114, at 36.
139. EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 63, at 49–52.
140. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4 (1967). The offending words allegedly included:
“Are your cherries ripe? Do you have big bombers? Do you give any away?”
TANENHAUS, supra note 13, at 32.
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delinquency petition that simply alleged Gault needed care and
custody.141 The judge questioned Gault about the telephone call,
which he admitted dialing, but insisted a companion spoke the
offending words.142 No witnesses testified, and there was no transcript
or record of the proceeding.143 No steps were taken to advise Gault or
his parents of his right to remain silent or to counsel, and the court
did not provide an attorney.144 A week later, the judge committed
Gault to the State Industrial School “for the period of his minority
[that is, until 21], unless sooner discharged by due process of law.”145
A judge could have sentenced an adult convicted of the same crime
to a $50 fine or two months’ imprisonment, rather than confinement
of up to six years.146
In its 1967 decision, the Supreme Court identified two fatal
disjunctions between juvenile justice rhetoric and reality: the theory
versus practice of rehabilitation and the expanded procedural
safeguards afforded criminal defendants compared with the meager
protections juveniles received. Although juvenile courts’ Progressive
founders and Dean Roscoe Pound aspired to exceptionally wellqualified judges—mature, wise, sophisticated, and versed in law and
social sciences—the President’s Crime Commission reported that
“half had not received undergraduate degrees; a fifth had received
no college education at all; a fifth were not members of the bar . . . .
and judicial hearings often are little more than attenuated interviews
of 10 or 15 minutes’ duration.”147 In addition, nearly all juveniles
appeared before judges without counsel. A survey of 207 juvenile
courts serving populations of 100,000 or more reported that lawyers
accompanied juveniles in 40% or more of cases in only 5% of courts,
and that counsel appeared in more than 20% of delinquency cases
only 15% of the time.148
Gault reviewed the juvenile court’s historical justifications for
omitting procedural safeguards: the proceedings were civil rather
than criminal; juveniles received treatment rather than punishment;
and when the State acted as parens patriae, the child was entitled to
141. Gault, 387 U.S. at 5–6.
142. Id. at 6.
143. Id. at 5–6.
144. Id. at 5–7.
145. Id. at 7–8 (alterations in original).
146. Id. at 29.
147. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 126, at 7.
148. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 126, at 82; BARRY C. FELD, JUSTICE
CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 54–56 (1993).
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custody rather than liberty.149 It noted that absence of procedures often
resulted in judicial arbitrariness rather than “careful, compassionate,
individualized treatment.”150 Youths could not challenge judges’
discretion even when they imposed punitive sanctions because most
juvenile court statutes did not authorize appeals.151 Gault did not reject
juvenile courts’ rehabilitative goals, but emphasized their high rates of
recidivism; the stigma of a delinquency label; access to court records
granted to military, law enforcement, and employers; and arbitrary
decision making as reasons to require procedural safeguards.152 The
Court also examined the institutions in which states purported to treat
juveniles, described them as quasi-penal places of confinement, and
concluded that “[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of being a
boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”153
Gault ruled that juvenile courts must conduct fundamentally fair
proceedings, which necessarily include notice of charges, an
impartial hearing, the opportunity to confront and cross-examine
witnesses, the privilege against self-incrimination, and, perhaps most
importantly, the assistance of counsel.154 However, the Court did not
address juveniles’ rights prior to trial—at intake and detention—or
after trial—at disposition and post-disposition—but rather focused
exclusively on the adjudication of guilt or innocence.155 The Court
also declined to address whether Gault’s protections extended to the
appellate stages of juvenile proceedings.156 “We do not in this opinion
consider the impact of these constitutional provisions upon the
totality of the relationship of the juvenile and the state,” Justice Fortas
149. Gault, 387 U.S. at 17–18.
150. Id. at 14–17.
151. MANFREDI, supra note 26, at 3–33; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REFORMING
JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH 36 (2013) [hereinafter NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013]. See generally Franklin E. Zimring, Penal Proportionality for the
Young Offender: Notes on Immaturity, Capacity, and Diminished Responsibility, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 271, 276 (Thomas Grisso &
Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000).
152. Gault, 387 U.S. at 18–19, 22–25, 22 n.30.
153. Id. at 27–28; see also BARRY C. FELD, NEUTRALIZING INMATE VIOLENCE: JUVENILE
OFFENDERS IN INSTITUTIONS 4–8 (1977) (describing conditions of confinement in
delinquency institutions).
154. Gault, 387 U.S. at 31–57; Feld, supra note 11, at 154–57; Francis Barry
McCarthy, Pre-Adjudicatory Rights in Juvenile Court: An Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 42 U. PITT. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1981); Irene M. Rosenberg, The
Constitutional Rights of Children Charged with Crime: Proposal for a Return to the Not So
Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 662–63 (1980).
155. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 31 n.48; McCarthy, supra note 154, at 459–60.
156. Gault, 387 U.S. at 13, 58.
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noted.157 “We do not even consider the entire process relating to
juvenile ‘delinquents.’”158
As in several of its other constitutional criminal procedure decisions,
the Warren Court endorsed adversarial procedures both to ensure the
factual accuracy of court proceedings and to limit the state’s power to
punish.159 One of the purposes of the privilege against selfincrimination, the Court noted, “is to prevent the state, whether by
force or by psychological domination, from overcoming the mind and
will of the person under investigation and depriving him of the
freedom to decide whether to assist the state in securing his
conviction.”160 The Warren Court’s commitment to “revitaliz[ing] the
adversary process in those parts of the system in which it was supposed
to flourish” and “extend[ing] the adversary process into areas of the
system in which, theretofore, adversary proceedings were unknown or
rarely employed” was one of its most distinctive tendencies.161
2.

Fundamental fairness
However, unlike its 1963 decision in Gideon v. Wainwright, in which
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused
the right to the assistance of counsel in all criminal prosecutions and
requires courts to provide counsel for defendants unable to hire
counsel unless the right was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
waived,162 Gault based the rights to notice, counsel, and confrontation
not on the Sixth Amendment, but on the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process requirement of fundamental fairness.163 The Arizona
Supreme Court had used the same fundamental fairness approach
when it rejected Gerald Gault’s pleas for procedural protections.164
The distinctions between the Fourteenth Amendment fundamental
fairness standard and Sixth Amendment fundamental rights standard
are marked. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury . . . and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; . . .
157. Id. at 13.
158. Id.
159. Allen, supra note 95, at 518–22; Feld, supra note 11, at 154–57.
160. Gault, 387 U.S. at 47.
161. Allen, supra note 95, at 530–31.
162. 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963).
163. MANFREDI, supra note 26, at 21; Sterling, supra note 20, at 633–42.
164. Gault, 387 U.S. at 4; see also MANFREDI, supra note 26, at 101–07 (discussing
the drafting of amicus briefs in Gault).
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and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”165 By contrast,
Fourteenth Amendment “[d]ue process of law requires notice of the
sort we have described—that is, notice which would be deemed
constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding.”166
Although Gault deemed delinquency proceedings “comparable in
seriousness to a felony prosecution,” it nonetheless afforded juveniles
fewer procedural protections than adults.167
Justice Hugo Black concurred in Gault, but argued that juveniles
should receive the same criminal procedural safeguards that the Bill
of Rights guarantees for adults, rather than what he called a “watereddown” judicial version of fairness embodied in generic notions of due
process.168 Importantly, both the Gault majority and Black’s
concurring opinion assumed that juveniles were competent to
exercise their newly-granted rights in conjunction with counsel.169
The Court recognized that providing counsel and other safeguards
could make proceedings more adversarial and complex, but
concluded that juveniles needed “advocates to speak for them and
guard their interests.”170
3.

Paternalism and racial neutrality
As a number of scholars have noted, there is considerable evidence
that the Warren Court’s 1967 decision in In re Gault, like the Court’s
other criminal procedure cases of the era, was intended to address
institutional racism in the juvenile court.171 Decided at “the peak of
165. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. (emphasis added).
166. Gault, 387 U.S. at 33.
167. Id. at 36. The Court did, however, afford juveniles the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. It held that “juvenile proceedings to determine
‘delinquency,’ which may lead to commitment to a state institution, must be
regarded as ‘criminal’ for purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination . . . . It
is incarceration against one’s will whether it is called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil.’” Id. at 49–
50. Granting the privilege against self-incrimination negated claims that delinquency
hearings were civil non-adversarial proceedings and rejected a core principle of
traditional juvenile jurisprudence that admissions of wrongdoing are an
indispensable element of the rehabilitation process. MANFREDI, supra note 26, at 105.
168. Gault, 387 U.S. at 61.
169. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013, supra note 151, at 37.
170. Gault, 387 U.S. at 39 n.65 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T &
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, supra note 131, at 86).
171. See, e.g., Neuborne, supra note 9, at 86 (“[T]he right to counsel cases from
Gideon to Argersinger were driven, in part, by concern over a criminal justice system
where white judges and prosecutors processed poor, unrepresented [B]lacks and
Hispanics.”); Sklansky, supra note 9, at 1805 (“[C]riminal procedure in the Warren
Court era was famously preoccupied with issues of illegitimate inequality, particularly those
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the civil rights period,” both Gideon and Gault “arguably served as an
important legal corollary to the civil rights struggle against racial
discrimination as they appeared to be concerned about the way
[B]lack defendants were being treated in the criminal and juvenile
justice systems.”172
It is surprising, then, that Gault is entirely race-neutral. Gerald
Gault was a white juvenile living in the southwestern United States. In
theory, the Court could have, but did not, select as its vehicle to
reshape the juvenile court one of any number of cases involving the
arbitrary and cruel treatment of a Black juvenile in the South.
Indeed, despite the Warren Court’s reported and apparent concern
about racial injustice, race was almost never explicitly discussed in its
criminal procedure and juvenile justice opinions.173
It is also curious that, despite its disenchantment with Progressivism,
the Court embraced aspects of the traditional “Child Savers” narrative.
Progressives were “appalled by adult procedures and penalties,” the
Court noted, and “profoundly convinced that society’s duty to the child
could not be confined by the concept of justice alone.”174 “On the one
hand, the Court assailed the then-current juvenile system as a ‘kangaroo
court,’” Robin Walker Sterling writes, while “[o]n the other hand,
despite the Court’s full-throated rebuke,” the Court adopted the
Child Savers’ rehabilitation story as a basis to rely on Fourteenth
Amendment fundamental fairness, and not fundamental rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights.175 Whether the Warren Court’s
reluctance to reject the juvenile court’s paternalistic and racially
discriminatory history in its seminal juvenile justice decision was
driven by fear of another Brown-type political backlash, a strategic
commitment to employing a less rigorous constitutional standard
than it had in Gideon, or a waning commitment to achieving racial
equality in the administration of criminal and juvenile justice, these
omissions would prove consequential.

associated with race.”); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure
and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (1997) (“The post-1960 constitutionalization of
criminal procedure arose, in large part, out of the sense that the system was treating [B]lack
suspects and defendants much worse than white ones. Warren-era constitutional criminal
procedure began as a kind of antidiscrimination law.”).
172. Henning et al., supra note 19, at 32.
173. Beale, supra note 18, at 524; Henning et al., supra note 19, at 32.
174. Gault, 387 U.S. at 15.
175. Sterling, supra note 20, at 644.
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II. RACE AND PUNISHMENT IN THE POST-GAULT ERA
One of Gault’s great ironies may be that, in an effort to alleviate the
juvenile court’s racial inequities, the Court may have unwittingly
compounded them. By endorsing an adversarial court process for
children and engrafting into the juvenile court some, but not all, of the
procedural rights afforded to adults, the Court unwittingly triggered the
juvenile court’s ideological, jurisprudential, procedural, jurisdictional,
and penal transformation into a second-class criminal court for youth
that meted out punishment without the protection of its criminal
counterpart. By any measure, these changes disproportionately
disadvantaged youth of color.
A. Procedural Formality and Institutional Convergence
When it was established in 1899, the purpose of the juvenile court
was “to secure for each minor . . . such care and guidance . . . as will
serve the moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the minor
and the best interests of the community.”176 By the early 1990s,
however, about one-quarter of the states had redefined their juvenile
courts’ purpose clauses to deemphasize rehabilitation and emphasize
public safety,177 children’s obligations to society,178 retributive
sanctions,179 and punishment.180
These changes were the product of a broader ideological shift that
took place in the 1970s and 1980s.181 In 1979, for example, the

176. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 405/1–2 (West 2019).
177. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 2008) (stating that the purpose of
the chapter is to “provide for the protection and safety of the public”); see also Feld,
supra note 22, at 842–47.
178. IND. CODE § 31-6-1-1 (1990), repealed by P.L.268-1995, Sec. 17 & P.L.1-1997,
Sec. 157 (claiming that the state wishes to “provide a juvenile justice system that
protects the public by enforcing the legal obligations children have to society”).
179. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(2)(a) (West 1988), amended by 2019 Fla. Sess. Law
Serv. 128 (West) (“[P]rotect society . . . [while] recognizing that the application of
sanctions which are consistent with the seriousness of the offense is appropriate in all
cases.”).
180. HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1985); see also Barry C. Feld, Juvenile and Criminal
Justice Systems’ Responses to Youth Violence, 24 Crime & Just. 189, 222 (1998) (“[S]tates
have revised their juvenile codes’ statement of legislative purpose, deemphasized
rehabilitation and the child’s best interest, and asserted the importance of public
safety, punishment, and accountability in the juvenile justice system.” (internal
citation omitted)).
181. See, e.g., In re D.F.B., 430 N.W.2d 475, 478 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988), aff’d, 433
N.W.2d 79 (Minn. 1988); State ex rel. D.D.H. v. Dostert, 269 S.E.2d 401, 408–09 (W.
Va. 1980).
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Washington Supreme Court rationalized a newly retributive purpose
clause on the grounds that “accountability for criminal behavior, the
prior criminal activity and punishment commensurate with age, crime
and criminal history does as much to rehabilitate . . . an errant youth as
does the prior philosophy of focusing upon . . . characteristics of the
individual juvenile.”182 Four years later, the Nevada Supreme Court
explicitly embraced punishment as a valid objective of the juvenile court,
explaining that “[b]y formally recognizing the legitimacy of punitive
and deterrent sanctions for criminal offenses[,] juvenile courts will be
properly and somewhat belatedly expressing society’s firm
disapproval of juvenile crime and will be clearly issuing a threat of
punishment for criminal acts to the juvenile population.”183
Gault also opened the door for additional Supreme Court decisions
that further increased juvenile courts’ procedural formality. In 1970,
in In re Winship,184 the Court held that the State must prove
delinquency by the criminal standard—beyond a reasonable doubt—
rather than by the lower civil standard of proof—preponderance of
the evidence.185 Five years later in Breed v. Jones,186 the Court held that
the double jeopardy protection of the Fifth Amendment barred
criminal prosecution of a youth whom a juvenile court previously
found delinquent for the same crime.187 Breed found that policies that
underlay the double jeopardy prohibition applied equally to
delinquency and criminal prosecutions.188
While Winship and Breed plainly brought important procedural
protections to the juvenile court, this jurisprudence, in combination
with subsequent Court decisions and federal and state legislation, had
the cumulative effect of criminalizing the juvenile court’s day-to-day
practices. Prior to Gault, for example, probation officers presented
juveniles’ cases in court and recommended dispositions; after Gault,
juveniles were given the right to counsel, and states introduced
prosecutors to off-set defense lawyers’ presence.189 Since prosecutors
182. State v. Lawley, 591 P.2d 772, 773 (Wash. 1979) (en banc); see also State v.
Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240, 242 (Wash. 1987) (en banc) (detailing that changes in
the Juvenile Justice Act did not require recognition of the right to a jury trial).
183. In re Seven Minors, 664 P.2d 947, 950 (Nev. 1983).
184. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
185. Id. at 368.
186. 421 U.S. 519 (1975).
187. Id. at 541.
188. Id. at 531.
189. Franklin E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus, On Strategy and Tactics for Contemporary
Reforms, in CHOOSING FOR THE FUTURE OF THE AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 216, 232 (Franklin
E. Zimring & David S. Tanenhaus eds., 2014); see also FELD, supra note 21.
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had been socialized in criminal courts to maximize convictions and
sentences, they began to import those norms into juvenile courts.190
These changes also made the juvenile court more hospitable to the
“get tough” laws that followed.
Finally, the juvenile court also underwent two significant jurisdictional
changes in the years after Gault. Status offenses, such as truancy or
incorrigibility, were removed from juvenile court jurisdiction in a number
of states, and, as discussed later, an increasingly large number of youth
and offenses were subjected to criminal court jurisdiction.191 Historically,
the juvenile court maintained jurisdiction over status offenses to prevent
low-level misconduct from escalating into criminality.192 Children
adjudicated delinquent as status offenders were detained and
incarcerated in the same institutions as those adjudicated for criminal
offenses.193 During the 1970s and 1980s, federal legislation along with
three state-level, administrative trends—diversion, deinstitutionalization,
and decriminalization—led to the removal of many so-called “status
offenders” from the juvenile court.194 While plainly warranted,195 this shift
had the effect of limiting the juvenile court’s jurisdictional authority to
children who committed crimes and “privatizing” the treatment of
middle-class status offenders.196
Even more significant were the jurisdictional shifts that took hold
during 1980s and 1990s. During this era, the juvenile court relinquished
jurisdiction over thousands of youth, not to facilitate rehabilitation and
protection, but to exact retribution and punishment.197

190. Zimring & Tanenhaus, supra note 189, at 232.
191. See infra Section II.C; see also Feld, supra note 2, at 696–708 (explaining
juvenile court jurisdiction over noncriminal status offenses post-Gault).
192. Id. at 697.
193. IRA M. SCHWARTZ, (IN)JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES: RETHINKING THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD 4 (1989) (discussing the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act, which proposed to remove juveniles from adult facilities).
194. Feld, supra note 191, at 697; see also FELD, supra note 18, at 173–79 (describing
reforms of status jurisdiction).
195. For information on treatment of status offenses by juvenile courts, see generally
BEYOND CONTROL: STATUS OFFENDERS IN THE JUVENILE COURT (Lee E. Teitelbaum & Aidan
R. Gough eds., 1977); FELD, supra note 18, at 166–88; STATUS OFFENDERS AND THE
JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: AN ANTHOLOGY (Richard Allinson ed., 1978).
196. SCHWARTZ, supra note 193, at 131; Lois A. Weithorn, Note, Mental Hospitalization of
Troublesome Youth: An Analysis of Skyrocketing Admission Rates, 40 STAN. L. REV. 773, 820–26
(1988) (discussing the trend of rising inpatient hospital treatment for children for
behaviors that had traditionally been categorized as criminal).
197. See infra Section II.C.
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B. Fundamental Fairness and Illusory Protection
One of Gault’s great paradoxes is that, even as it decried the
juvenile court’s procedural vacuity, it opted for a tepid constitutional
framework that undermined its own mandates in several ways. First,
Gault’s failure to create a Sixth Amendment right to counsel for
children opened the door for the Court’s 1971 decision in McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, which held that juveniles do not have the constitutional
right to a jury trial.198 Despite a ruling in 1968 in Duncan v.
Louisiana,199 which held the Sixth Amendment guaranteed adults the
right to a jury trial in state criminal proceedings,200 McKeiver held that
Fourteenth Amendment due process required only accurate factfinding, which, the Court believed a juvenile court judge could do as
well as a jury. The Court did not articulate its rationale for rejecting
the approach it had used in Duncan beyond asserting that juvenile
court cases were not criminal prosecutions.201 Granting juveniles a jury
trial “will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process
and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of
an intimate, informal protective proceeding,” the Court cautioned.202
As several scholars have noted, McKeiver denied juveniles what is
arguably the most important check against prosecutorial overreach.203
Second, Gault’s failure to confer a constitutional right to appellate
review insulated juvenile court judges from oversight.204 Evidence
suggests that adult defense lawyers appeal criminal cases about ten
times more often than juvenile defenders.205 There are myriad
explanations: juvenile court culture, even among public defenders,
may discourage appeals as an impediment to a youth assuming
198. McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); see also Sterling, supra note 20,
at 647–60 (discussing the misstep taken by the Court in McKeiver decision).
199. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
200. Id. at 162.
201. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 541.
202. Id. at 545.
203. Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension between Apprendi and McKeiver:
Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile
Courts, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1111, 1150 (2003). See generally Martin R. Gardner, Punitive
Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver
World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2012) (asserting that the McKeiver decision misunderstood the
distinction between punitive and rehabilitative dispositions).
204. See Mary Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 577, 633 (2002) (arguing that the low appeal rate of juvenile
convictions is due in part to the waivers of counsel at trial).
205. Donald J. Harris, Due Process v. Helping Kids in Trouble: Implementing the Right to
Appeal for Adjudications of Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98 DICK. L. REV. 209, 220 (1994).
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responsibility; overwhelming caseloads make specialized appellate
divisions a luxury few defender offices can afford; the vast majority of
juveniles enter guilty pleas, which waive the right to appeal and
further precludes appellate review; juveniles who waived counsel at
trial will be less aware of or able to pursue an appeal; and the short
length of most juvenile dispositions renders many appealed cases
moot if the child is released before a court reviews the case.206 As one
troubled state Supreme Court observed, “We cannot help but notice
that the children’s cases appealed to this court have often shown
much more extensive and fundamental error than is generally found
in adult criminal cases . . . .”207
The lack of appeals from juvenile courts also retards the
development of substantive law. Appellate courts can only rule if
parties present issues to them. If defense counsel does not challenge
judges’ decisions, then appellate courts cannot develop a body of case
law. The dearth of substantive law undermines attorneys’ views of
juvenile courts as courts of law, discourages their presence, and limits
the arguments available to creative advocates.208
Third, given the relative impotence of the Fourteenth Amendment
standard and the absence of two of the justice system’s most
fundamental checks on state power—trial by jury and appeal—it is
not surprising that Gault’s right to counsel is woefully underenforced.
When the Court decided Gault, lawyers appeared in fewer than 5% of
delinquency cases.209 A study attributed the absence of counsel to
“juvenile court judges’ actively discouraging juveniles from retaining
counsel and . . . [to] the inability of attorneys to perform their
traditional role in juvenile courts.”210 Although states amended their
juvenile codes to comply with Gault, evaluations of initial compliance
found that most judges did not advise juveniles of their rights, and
the vast majority did not appoint counsel.211 Research in Minnesota in
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

See Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice Appeals, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671 (2012).
RLR. v. State, 487 P.2d 27, 38 (Alaska 1971).
FELD, supra note 18, at 136.
MANFREDI, supra note 26, at 40–41.
Id. at 41.
See, e.g., M. A. BORTNER, INSIDE A JUVENILE COURT: THE TARNISHED IDEAL OF
INDIVIDUALIZED JUSTICE 139 (1982); David P. Aday, Jr., Court Structure, Defense Attorney
Use, and Juvenile Court Decisions, 27 SOC. Q. 107, 114 (1986); Bradley C. Canon &
Kenneth Kolson, Rural Compliance with Gault: Kentucky, a Case Study, 10 J. FAM. L. 300,
306 (1971); Stevens H. Clarke & Gary G. Koch, Juvenile Court: Therapy or Crime Control,
and Do Lawyers Make a Difference?, 14 L. & SOC’Y REV. 263, 297 (1980); Elyce Z. Ferster
et al., The Juvenile Justice System: In Search of the Role of Counsel, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. 375,
376–77 (1971); Norman Lefstein et al., In Search of Juvenile Justice: Gault and Its
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the mid-1980s, for example, reported that most youths appeared
without counsel, that rates of representation varied widely in urban,
suburban, and rural counties, and that one-third of youths removed
from home and one-quarter of those in institutions were
unrepresented.212 Similarly, a 1988 study of delivery of legal services
in six states reported that only three of them appointed counsel for a
substantial majority of juveniles,213 and in 1995, the General
Accounting Office confirmed that rates of representation varied
widely among and within states and that judges tried and sentenced
many unrepresented youths.214
In the mid-1990s, the American Bar Association (ABA) published
two reports on juveniles’ legal needs. One report, America’s Children at
Risk, illustrated that many children appeared without counsel and
that lawyers who represented youth lacked adequate training and
often failed to provide effective assistance.215 The other report, A Call
for Justice, focusing on the quality of defense lawyers, again reported
that many youths appeared without counsel, and that many attorneys
failed to appreciate the challenges of representing young clients.216
Since the late 1990s, the ABA and the National Juvenile Defender
Center (NJDC) have conducted more than twenty state-by-state

Implementation, 3 L. & SOC’Y REV. 491, 517–24, 530–37 (1969). See generally WILLIAM
VAUGHAN STAPLETON & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, IN DEFENSE OF YOUTH: A STUDY OF THE
ROLE OF COUNSEL IN AMERICAN JUVENILE COURTS (1972) (examining the impact of
lawyers representing juveniles and positing that a lawyer’s effectiveness is dependent
on hearing structure and court personnel).
212. Feld, supra note 22, at 871–75; Barry C. Feld, The Right to Counsel in Juvenile
Court: An Empirical Study of When Lawyers Appear and the Difference They Make, 79 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1185, 1199–200 (1989); see also FELD, supra note 148, at 54–
56; Barry C. Feld, Justice by Geography: Urban, Suburban, and Rural Variations in Juvenile
Justice Administration, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 156 (1991).
213. Barry C. Feld, In re Gault Revisited: A Cross-State Comparison of the Right to
Counsel in Juvenile Court, 34 CRIME & DELINQ. 393, 400–01 (1988) (reporting that only
three of six states studied appointed counsel for a majority of youths).
214. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-95-139, JUVENILE JUSTICE:
REPRESENTATION RATES VARIED AS DID COUNSEL’S IMPACT ON COURT OUTCOMES (1995).
215. AM. BAR ASS’N, AMERICA’S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR LEGAL
ACTION 60 (1993); see also Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal
Significance of Adolescent Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In re
Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 125, 142–47, 142 n.105 (2007) (discussing the right to
counsel and the difficulties of understanding court processes without a lawyer).
216. PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., AM. BAR ASS’N JUV. JUST. CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 52–56 (1995) [hereinafter A CALL FOR JUSTICE], https://static.prisonpolicy.
org/scans/aba/cfjfull.pdf [https://perma.cc/7TJB-URBW.
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assessments of access to and quality of counsel.217 The NJDC’s 2017
study reports that, though every state has a basic structure to provide
attorneys for children at the adjudication phase of delinquency
proceedings, few juvenile defendants actually have meaningful access
to counsel.218 Recent research reveals that only eleven states provide a
court-appointed lawyer to every child charged with a delinquency
defense regardless of financial status,219 just one state provides lawyers
for some children arrested for serious crimes during interrogation,220
only eleven provide meaningful access to lawyers at post-adjudication,221
thirty-six states charge fees for court-appointed lawyers,222 and fortythree states allow children to waive their right to counsel without first
consulting with an attorney.223
Several factors account for lack of representation in juvenile court.
Public defender services may be less available in non-urban areas.224
Judges may give cursory advisories of the right to counsel, imply that
waivers are just legal technicalities, and readily find waivers to ease

217. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N JUV. JUST. CTR. ET AL., JUSTICE CUT SHORT: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS IN OHIO 15–16, 25 (Kim Brooks & Darlene Kamine eds., 2003); AM. BAR
ASS’N JUV. JUST. CTR. ET AL., KENTUCKY: ADVANCING JUSTICE: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS
TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 29
(Patricia Puritz & Kim Brooks eds., 2002); AM. BAR ASS’N JUV. JUST. CTR. ET AL., THE
CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF
REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS IN LOUISIANA 59–62 (Gabriella Celeste
& Patricia Puritz eds., 2001); AM. BAR ASS’N JUV. JUST. CTR. ET AL., VIRGINIA: AN
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY
PROCEEDINGS 24–25 (Patricia Puritz et al. eds., 2002); see also Susanne M. Bookser,
Making Gault Meaningful: Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency
Proceedings for Indigent Youth, 3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 297 (2004); Steven
A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?
34 N. KY. L. REV. 275 (2007).
218. Feld, supra note 213, at 400–01 (reporting that only three of six states studied
appointed counsel for a majority of youths); FELD, supra note 21, at 245–48 (reporting
that many, if not most, delinquents appeared in juvenile court without counsel).
219. NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., supra note 15, at 10.
220. Id. at 16 (citing 705 Ill. Comp. Stat. § 405 / 5-170 (2017)) (providing that any
child younger than 15 and accused of enumerated serious offenses must be
represented by counsel during the entire custodial interrogation).
221. Id. at 31–32.
222. Id. at 22.
223. Id. at 25–26.
224. A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra note 216, at 52–56.
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their administrative burdens.225 If judges expect to impose noncustodial sentences, then they may dispense with counsel.226 Some
jurisdictions charge fees to determine a youth’s eligibility for a public
defender, and others base youths’ eligibility on their parents’
income.227 Parents may be reluctant to retain or accept an attorney if,
as in many states, they may be required to reimburse attorney fees if
they can afford them.228
By far, the most common explanation for underrepresentation,
however, is waiver of counsel.229 Gault required judges to advise
juveniles and their parents of the right to have a lawyer appointed if
they were indigent, but also held that juveniles could waive counsel.230
In 2013, the National Academy of Sciences reported that “[i]n
Louisiana, as many as 90 percent of youth waived their right to
counsel . . . , and in many other states, including Florida, Georgia,
and Kentucky, more than 50 percent of youth waived that right.”231
Despite this, most states do not use special procedural safeguards—
mandatory nonwaivable appointment or prewaiver consultation with
a lawyer, for example—to protect juveniles from improvident waiver
decisions.232 Instead, they use the adult waiver standard—knowing,
intelligent, and voluntary—to gauge juveniles’ relinquishment of
counsel. Because this is also the standard that the Court in Fare v.
Michael C.233 endorsed to gauge juveniles’ Miranda waivers of
counsel,234 criminological studies and developmental research on
Miranda waivers generalize to juveniles’ counsel waivers as well.235 As
225. Id. at 44–45; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013, supra note 151, at 199; Berkheiser,
supra note 204; Bookser, supra note 217; N. Lee Cooper et al., Fulfilling the Promise of In re
Gault: Advancing the Role of Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 654–60 (1998).
226. See Feld, supra note 11, at 189–90; Feld, supra note 212, at 1256–57; Lefstein et al.,
supra note 211, at 530–33; see also George W. Burrus, Jr. & Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, The
Questionable Advantage of Defense Counsel in Juvenile Court, 19 JUST. Q. 37 (2002) (comparing
the efficacy of legal counsel on case outcomes in juvenile delinquency matters).
227. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013, supra note 151, at 199.
228. FELD, supra note 18, at 127; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013, supra note 151, at
199; Feld, supra note 212, at 1200 & n.64.
229. A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra note 216; FELD, supra note 148, at 29; Berkheiser,
The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel, supra note 203, at 649–50.
230. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1967).
231. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013, supra note 151, at 199–200 (internal citation omitted).
232. FELD, supra note 148, at 290–91; NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., supra note 15, at
26–28; Feld, supra note 11, at 169–90.
233. 442 U.S. 707 (1979).
234. Id. at 725–27.
235. See, e.g., BARRY C. FELD, KIDS, COPS, AND CONFESSIONS: INSIDE THE
INTERROGATION ROOM 82–85 (2013).
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with Miranda, formal equality between juveniles and adults results in
practical inequality—lawyers represent juveniles at much lower rates
than they do criminal defendants.236
Moreover, many juveniles do not understand their rights or the
role of lawyers and waive counsel without consulting with either a
parent or an attorney.237 And even youths who understand the
counsel advisory’s words may be unable to exercise rights in a
meaningful way238 because they do not appreciate the function or
importance of rights as well as adults.239 Although judges are
supposed to conduct a dialogue with youth to determine whether a
child can understand rights and represent herself in juvenile court,
they frequently fail to give delinquents any counsel advisory, often
neglect to create a record, and readily accept waivers from manifestly
incompetent children.240 Juveniles’ diminished competence, inability
to understand proceedings, and judicial encouragement to waive
counsel result in larger proportions of juveniles adjudicated without
lawyers than adult defendants.241
In addition, like adult criminal defendants, the overwhelming
majority of juvenile defendants admit to charges.242 Because most
states deny juveniles the right to a jury trial, they have very little plea

236. See, e.g., FELD, supra note 148; CAROLINE W. HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL CASES (2000); JUDITH B. JONES, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
& DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, ACCESS TO COUNSEL (2004); Burrus & Kempf-Leonard,
supra note 226; Feld, Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense, supra note 22.
237. Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youths’ Capacities as Trial Defendants, in
YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 139, 247
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwarz eds., 2000). See generally Berkheiser, supra note
204 (discussing juvenile waiver of counsel).
238. Thomas Grisso & C. Pomiciter, Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of
Procedures, Safeguards, and Rights Waiver, 1 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 321, 339 (1977); see also
Marty Beyer, Immaturity, Culpability, and Competency in Juveniles: A Study of 17 Cases, 15
CRIM. JUST. 26 (2000) (examining how immaturity affects juveniles’ ability to
participate in the justice system).
239. See, e.g., THOMAS GRISSO, JUVENILES’ WAIVER OF RIGHTS: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE 130 (1981); Thomas Grisso, The Competence of Adolescents
as Trial Defendants, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 3, 11 (1997); Kimberly Larson,
Improving the “Kangaroo Courts”: A Proposal for Reform in Evaluating Juveniles’ Waiver of
Miranda, 48 VILL. L. REV. 629, 649–53 (2003).
240. See, e.g., In re Manuel R., 543 A.2d 719 (Conn. 1988); In re Christopher H., 596
S.E.2d 500 (S.C. Ct. App. 2004). See generally Berkheiser, supra note 204.
241. Feld, supra note 22.
242. FELD, supra note 235, at 13; Joseph B. Sanborn, Jr., Pleading Guilty in Juvenile
Court: Minimal Ado About Something Very Important to Young Defendants, 9 JUST. Q. 127
(1992); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013, supra note 151, at 201–02.
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bargaining leverage.243 Even though admitting to a charge is perhaps
the most critical decision a juvenile defendant makes, states use adult
standards to evaluate their competence to enter a plea.244 Because
appellate courts seldom review juveniles’ waivers of counsel, pleas
made without counsel receive even less judicial scrutiny.245
Finally, it is worth noting that some studies have found that
juveniles appearing with counsel fare worse at disposition in certain
situations than those without.246 A recent meta-analysis evaluating the
impact of counsel on dispositions, for example, concluded that youth
represented by attorneys were more than twice as likely to receive outof-home placements as those without counsel.247 There are myriad
explanations for these findings: judges may be more likely to appoint
attorneys when they anticipate more severe sentences;248 juveniles’
developmental limitations and incomplete understanding of a
lawyer’s role may undermine the lawyer’s ability to represent them
effectively;249 lawyers assigned to juvenile court may not be fully
trained to litigate juvenile court cases and make dispositional
arguments;250 a lack of adequate funding for defender services may
243. Irene Merker Rosenberg, Leaving Bad Enough Alone: A Response to the Juvenile
Court Abolitionists, 1993 WIS. L. REV. 163, 169–70 (1993).
244. Sanborn, supra note 242, at 127–28; Lacey Cole Singleton, Note, Say “Pleas”:
Juveniles’ Competence to Enter Plea Agreements, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 439, 445 (2007).
245. Berkheiser, supra note 204, at 633; Sanborn, supra note 242, at 131; see also
Harris, supra note 205, at 221–22 (discussing the statistical difficulties of measuring
appellate oversight of guilty pleas because appeals from guilty pleas are included with
appeals from trials).
246. Burruss & Kempf-Leonard, supra note 226, at 60; Feld, supra note 212, at
1236-38; George W. Burruss et al., Fifty Years Post Gault: A Meta-Analysis of the Impact of
Attorney Representation on Delinquency Outcomes, J. CRIM. JUST. (forthcoming) (reporting
that represented youths are twice as likely to receive out of home placement as
unrepresented youths); see also Feld, supra note 212, at 190, 208 (noting that judges
imposed harsher sentences in urban areas, which are the same areas where juveniles
experience higher rates of representation).
247. Burrus et al., supra note 246 (“[T]he lawyer penalty was robust over time,
across analysis type (bivariate or multivariate when both were included in the final
analysis), and whether individual-level or state-level court data were used . . . .
[T]hese studies suggest that represented juveniles in the U.S. juvenile justice system
are twice as likely to be removed from their home and/or placed in an institution
than those not represented.”).
248. Canon & Kolson, supra note 211, at 319–20.
249. Emily Buss, The Role of Lawyers in Promoting Juveniles’ Competence as Defendants,
in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note
151, at 243, 248.
250. See JANE KNITZER & MERRIL SOBIE, LAW GUARDIANS IN NEW YORK STATE: A STUDY
OF THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN 116 (1984); Cooper et al., supra note 225,
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preclude investigations, which increases the risk of wrongful
convictions;251 and juvenile courts’ parens patriae ideology may
discourage “zealous advocacy” and engender adverse consequences
for attorneys who “rock the boat.”252
There is also the reality that many defense attorneys work under
conditions that create structural impediments to quality
representation.253 Observations and qualitative assessments in dozens
of states report derisory working conditions—crushing caseloads,
penurious compensation, scant support services, inexperienced
attorneys and inadequate supervision—that detract from or preclude
effective representation.254 Not surprisingly, ineffective assistance of
counsel correlates with heightened risks of false confessions,255
wrongful convictions,256 placement in secure detention,257 and the
imposition of collateral consequences.258 None of this is to say that
at 656–57 (noting that many juvenile defenders lack experience in juvenile cases and
devote little time for their preparation).
251. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 217, at 284, 290.
252. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013, supra note 151, at 201; Drizin & Luloff, supra
note 217, at 291–92; see also Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-imagining Childhood and
Reconstructing the Legal Order: The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV.
1083, 1122 n.263, 1129 (1991).
253. A CALL FOR JUSTICE, supra note 216, at 24; see also Cooper et al., supra note
225, at 656–57 (explaining that many defense lawyers devote little time to preparing
for juvenile cases and that many lacked prior experience in juvenile cases).
254. CELESTE & PURITZ, supra note 217, at 54–55, 57; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL
2013, supra note 151, at 58; PURITZ & BROOKS, supra note 217, at 27, 32; PURITZ ET AL.,
supra note 217, at 19–21, 29–30.
255. See FELD, supra note 235, at 230 (explaining that youths are uniquely prone to
give false confessions).
256. Drizin & Luloff, supra note 217, at 283–84; see also FELD, supra note 21, at 272
(noting that underfunded public defenders routinely fail to provide effective counsel).
257. WILLIAM ECENBARGER, KIDS FOR CASH: TWO JUDGES, THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN,
AND A $2.8 MILLION KICKBACK SCHEME 248–49 (2012); see also Robert G. Schwartz &
Marsha Levick, When a “Right” Is Not Enough: Implementation of the Right to Counsel in an
Age of Ambivalence, 9 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 365, 367 (2010) (citing data from the
Juvenile Law Center showing that lack of counsel correlates with out-of-home detention).
258. See FELD, supra note 21, at 268–70 (noting that delinquency convictions can
result in extensive collateral consequences that can affect housing, education, and
professional licensure and employment opportunities; record sharing with other
government agencies; loss of driving privilege; sex offender registration; and other
similar repercussions); JOSHUA ROVNER, SENTENCING PROJECT, DISPROPORTIONATE
MINORITY CONTACT IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 7 (2014), https://www.
sentencingproject.org/publications/disproportionate-minority-contact-in-the-juvenilejustice-system [https://perma.cc/CZ5L-8A5B]; MELISSA SICKMUND & CHARLES
PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2014
NATIONAL REPORT
157–59,
214
(2014),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/
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counsel should not be appointed for juveniles facing delinquency
charges. On the contrary, these studies suggest that juvenile defenders
must be better funded, better trained, better resourced, more
experienced, and appointed not in just the most serious cases.
C. Rights, Politics, and Compensatory Punishment
If it is true that the Warren Court omitted race and opted for a
comparatively weak constitutional framework in Gault, in an effort to
avoid political fallout, its strategy did not work. A punitive backlash
was already percolating.
The political rhetoric of “law and order” first emerged in the late
1950s. Angered by the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of
Education, southern politicians called for a crackdown on the
“‘hoodlums’ and ‘agitators’ . . . who challenged segregation and
African American disenfranchisement.”259 A decade later, Barry
Goldwater’s “crime in the streets” condemnation of American society
brought criminal justice into the national political discourse. “History
shows us . . . that . . . nothing prepares the way for tyranny . . . more
than the failure of public offices to keep the streets safe from bullies
and marauders,” Goldwater warned during his acceptance speech at
the 1964 Republican convention.260 Goldwater’s message resonated.
By 1968, 80% of the public agreed that crime was increasing, “law
and order had broken down” in the United States, and that “Negroes
who start riots” were the source of the problem.261 Being “tough on
crime” provided a political opportunity to use race as a wedge issue
for electoral advantage.262
Over the next three decades, lawmakers enacted a series of
increasingly harsh tough-on-crime measures. In 1968, for example, in
nr2014/downloads/NR2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/7BU5-4AU8] (noting that more
than half of juveniles in detention did not have a lawyer).
259. Katherine Beckett & Theodore Sasson, The Origins of the Current Conservative
Discourse on Law and Order, in CONSERVATIVE AGENDAS AND CAMPAIGNS: THE RISE OF THE
MODERN “TOUGH ON CRIME” MOVEMENT 44, 44 (2005), http://www.publiceye.org/
defendingjustice/pdfs/chapters/toughcrime.pdf [https://perma.cc/4QDN-6YWT].
260. Barry Goldwater, Acceptance Address at the 1964 Republican National
Convention (July 16, 1964) (transcript available at http://www.4president.org/
speeches/1964/barrygoldwater1964acceptance.htm [https://perma.cc/2DXX-FRBY]).
261. BECKETT, supra note 63, at 38.
262. See Beckett & Sasson, supra note 259, at 43–44; see, e.g., Cornell W. Clayton &
J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Politics of Criminal Justice: How the New Right Regime Shaped the
Rehnquist Court’s Criminal Justice Jurisprudence, 94 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1396 tbl.1 (2006)
(noting that the 1968 election saw both parties devote higher percentages of their
political platforms to criminal justice than in previous presidential elections).
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an attempt to assure the public that he was tough on crime, President
Johnson signed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968,263 which increased funding for law enforcement and provided
for expanded use of wiretaps and Miranda-less confessions.264 The
Omnibus Bill’s eventual successor, the now infamous Violent Crime
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,265 authorized more than
$30 billion for crime-prevention efforts, law enforcement, and state
prison construction.266 In parallel, individual states enacted measures
like California’s three-strikes law,267 which mandates twenty-five years
to life sentences following conviction for any third felony, and New
Jersey’s Megan’s Law,268 which requires sex offender registration and
public notification.269 Multiple states also adopted truth-in-sentencing
laws, mandatory minimum sentencing laws, and zero-tolerance
practices, which resulted in harsher penalties and the virtual
elimination of rehabilitation programs.270
Comparable laws and policies were enacted in the juvenile justice
system during what would come to be known as the “get tough” era.271
As juvenile crime rates climbed between the mid-1980s and 1990s,272
calls for stiffer penalties for adolescent lawbreakers became louder.

263. Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (1968).
264. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 §§ 201-406 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 3711 (2006)).
265. Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994).
266. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 §§ 20109, 30104,
30202, 30403, 30702, 30802, 31132, 31707, 31904, 40414, 40422, 40603, 90206,
200112, 200210, 210306, 250005, 270009, 310003, 310004 (cataloguing various
appropriations provisions within the Act) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 13071–14223).
267. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(a)(1), (e)(2)(A) (West 2019) (providing for a fiveyear enhancement for each prior felony and an indeterminate life sentence of at
least twenty-five years for a third felony).
268. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-12, 7-13(a)–(b) to -19 (West 2019).
269. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:7-12, 7-13(a)–(b). Congress enacted a federal version of
Megan’s Law in 1996, which requires states to form registries of offenders convicted
of either sexually violent offenses or offenses against children. See Jacob Wetterling
Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub L. No.
103-322, 108 Stat. 2038 (1994), amended by Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety
Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 16901,
16902, 16912, 16913 (2012)) (maintaining earlier version).
270. MICHAEL TONRY, PUNISHING RACE: A CONTINUING AMERICAN DILEMMA 124 (2011).
271. See Perry L. Moriearty & William Carson, Cognitive Warfare and Young Black
Males in America, 15 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 281, 299–300 (2012).
272. See FELD, supra note 18, at 201 (“[T]he juvenile arrest rate for all violent
crimes increased 67.3% . . . between 1986 and 1995.”).
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Conservative politicians branded them “super-predators.”273 If
lawmakers did not do more to incapacitate them, then, as former
Princeton Professor John DiIulio predicted in 1996, there would be
270,000 more super-predators on the streets by 2010.274 “Unless we
act today, we’re going to have a bloodbath when these kids grow up,”
criminologist James Fox warned.275
Lawmakers responded. Between 1992 and 1997 alone, legislatures
in forty-five states enacted or enhanced statutes that made it easier to
punish children like adults.276 Thirty-one states gave both juvenile and
criminal courts expanded sentencing authority over juveniles, fortyseven states enacted laws that modified or removed traditional
juvenile court confidentiality provisions by making records and
proceedings more open, and twenty-two states expanded the role of
juvenile crime victims in the juvenile justice process.277 Laws like
California’s Proposition 21,278 which required adult trials for juveniles
as young as fourteen, transferred discretion from judges to
prosecutors, weakened confidentiality laws, toughened gang laws, and
expanded California’s three-strikes law for both juveniles and adults,
became the norm.279
The net effect of these laws was extraordinary. Between 1985 and
1994, the number of delinquency cases judicially waived to criminal

273. DiIulio, supra note 35, at 25–26; see also John DiIulio, Defining Criminality Up,
WALL STREET J., July 3, 1996, at A10; Suzanne Fields, The Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES,
Oct. 17, 1996, at A23 (“The super-predator is upon us”); Gene Koprowski, The Rise of
the Teen Super-Predator, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1996, at A17. See generally Perry L.
Moriearty, Framing Justice: Media, Bias, and Legal Decisionmaking, 69 MD. L. REV. 849,
864–68 (2010) (discussing the “super-predator” era of juvenile justice).
274. The Superpredator Myth, 20 Years Later, EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE (Apr. 7, 2014),
https://eji.org/news/superpredator-myth-20-years-later [https://perma.cc/H4QXTAA7]; see also WILLIAM J. BENNETT ET AL., BODY COUNT: MORAL POVERTY . . . AND HOW
TO WIN AMERICA’S WAR AGAINST CRIME AND DRUGS 26 (1996) (charting the projected
increase in the United States juvenile population between 1990 and 2010).
275. Laurie Garrett, Murders by Teens Soaring, NEWSDAY, Feb. 18, 1995, at A11.
276. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. JUVENILE JUSTICE,
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 96 (2006),
http://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/nr2006/downloads/NR2006.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VJ4-RCQK]; PATRICIA TORBET ET AL., STATE RESPONSES TO
SERIOUS AND VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: RESEARCH REPORT 3–4 (1996).
277. See SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 276, at 96–97.
278. Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998, § (2), Ballot
Measure 4, 1999–2000 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (codified at CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 707(d) (West 2019)).
279. See Proposition 21, CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., https://lao.ca.gov/ballot/
2000/21_03_2000.html [https://perma.cc/P9HM-4KYL].
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court climbed to 83%, from 7200 to 13,200.280 In 1988, approximately
1600 juveniles were confined in adult jails; by 1997, there were more
than 9000.281 More than 2000 of these youth were serving sentences
of life without the possibility of parole282—a punishment to which no
other country in the Western world subscribed.
D. Racialized Juvenile Justice
All of these post-Gault dynamics, such as the criminalization of the
juvenile court, lack of access to well-trained, well-funded counsel, and
the extraordinary punitiveness of the “get tough” era, had the
harshest impact on youth of color. While social scientists had known
for decades that adolescents of color, and Black youth in particular,
were more likely than their white counterparts to be arrested,
detained, formally charged in juvenile court, transferred to adult
court, and confined to secure residential facilities,283 these disparities
grew exponentially during the 1980s and 1990s. Between 1983 and 1997,
four out of five youth newly held in detention were children of color,284
and the disparities in the transfer of juveniles of color were even greater.
A 2000 study, for example, showed that 82% of youth charged in adult
court in eighteen of the largest jurisdictions in the country were youth of
280. Snyder & Sickmund, supra note 276, at 186. The combined effects of judicial
waiver, prosecutorial direct file, offense exclusion, and age of majority laws result in
more than 200,000 chronological juveniles tried in criminal courts annually. Barry C.
Feld & Donna M. Bishop, Transfer of Juveniles to Criminal Court, in OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF JUVENILE CRIME AND JUVENILE JUSTICE, supra note 42, at 801, 815.
281. JAMES AUSTIN ET AL., BUREAU JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, JUVENILES IN ADULT PRISONS
AND JAILS: A NATIONAL ASSESSMENT 5, tbl.2 (2000), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/bja/182503.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6E5-RRBN].
282. State Distribution of Youth Offenders Serving Juvenile Life Without Parole (JLWOP),
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 2, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/news/2009/10/02/statedistribution-youth-offenders-serving-juvenile-life-without-parole-jlwop
[https://perma.cc/C75M-EJNQ].
283. Indeed, the problem of racial disparities in the juvenile justice system is so
long-standing, wide-spread, and entrenched that it has earned its own acronym—
Disproportionate Minority Contact or “DMC.” POE-YAMAGATA & JONES, supra note 39,
at 5–6 (explaining the meaning of disproportionate minority contact); see also CARL
E. POPE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONFINEMENT: A
REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH LITERATURE FROM 1989 THROUGH 2001 10 n.1 (2002)
(describing “race effects” within the juvenile justice system and suggesting these
effects impact minority juveniles); Michael J. Leiber, Disproportionate Minority
Confinement (DMC) of Youth: An Analysis of State and Federal Efforts to Address the Issue, 48
CRIME & DELINQ. 3, 4–5 (2002) (describing how states enact methods to address the
effects of disproportionate minority confinement).
284. HINTON HOYTT ET AL., supra note 38, at 10 (documenting the significant increases
in racial disproportionality in juvenile detention facilities during the 1990s).
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color. Moreover, Black and Latino youth were much more likely than
white youth to receive a sentence of incarceration.285
Racial disparities remain extreme today. In 2014, white youth
comprised 70% of those ages ten to seventeen in the United States,
but only 35% of arrested youth, 41% of adjudicated youth, and 33%
of youth waived into the adult system.286 Conversely, Black youth
comprised just 16% of those ages ten to seventeen nationally, but
were 42% of arrested youth, 37% of adjudicated youth, and 53% of
youth waived into the adult system.287 Youth of color currently
comprise approximately 45% of the general youth population, but
they are almost 70% of the youth being held in residential facilities by
juvenile courts.288 When youth of color violate a technical condition
of probation—failure to meet with a probation officer or pay
restitution—they are significantly more likely to be committed to an
out-of-home placement than are white youths.289
Critically, studies have repeatedly shown that any statistical
differences in offending patterns are simply not great enough to
account for the racial disparities observed at any of the processing
points in the U.S. juvenile justice system.290 Instead, research suggests
that the primary sources of these disparities are the overcriminalization, over-policing, and over-punishment of juveniles of
color, and the implicit racial biases that drive decision makers to
rationalize their disparate treatment.291
285. JUSZKIEWICZ, supra note 38, at 3, 5, 9 (providing a study of more than 2500
cases filed in eighteen of the largest jurisdictions in the country demonstrated that
African-American youth were disproportionately charged in adult court and were
more likely than white or Latino youth to receive a sentence of incarceration).
286. Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2017, NAT’L CTR. JUV. JUST.,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezajcs/asp/selection.asp [https://perma.cc/4GD9-S7Q3]
(last updated Apr. 23, 2019); Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990–2018, supra note 40.
287. See Easy Access to Juvenile Court Statistics: 1985–2017, supra note 286; Easy Access
to Juvenile Populations: 1990–2018, supra note 40.
288. Easy Access to the Census Data of Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997–2017,
NAT’L CTR. JUV. JUST., https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/display.asp
[https://perma.cc/U8KV-YPQ4] (last updated Apr. 23, 2019).
289. BURNS INST., STEMMING THE RISING TIDE: RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN YOUTH
INCARCERATION & STRATEGIES FOR CHANGE 10 (2016), https://www.burnsinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/Stemming-the-Rising-Tide_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/77GK-Y2JB].
290. See HINTON HOYTT ET AL., supra note 284, at 20–22 (explaining that white youths
admit to various offenses at higher rates than Black youths, but that Black youths are
arrested at significantly higher rates than white youths for these same offenses).
291. While research suggests that Black youth commit “slightly more violent
crime” than white youth, they commit “about the same amount of property crime,
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Research has consistently shown that racial disparities in juvenile
processing are most pronounced at the point of arrest. Black youth
are twice as likely as white youth to be arrested for the same
conduct,292 and these disparities have remained even as overall levels
of arrests have decreased.293 Research also finds that law enforcement
tend to arrest youth of color for all levels of offenses, but, on average,
arrest white youth only for medium- or high-level offenses.294 In other
words, youth of color are more likely to be arrested for low-level, nonviolent behavior than their white counterparts. More troubling still,
these front-end disparities grow into larger disparities as youth move
through juvenile and criminal legal processing,295 which
disproportionately subjects youth of color to the well-documented
harms of detention and secure confinement.296
When it comes to disposition, studies show that Black youth are 4.1
times as likely to be committed to secure placements as white youth,
Indigenous youth are 3.1 times as likely, and Latino/Hispanic youth

and less drug crime than white youth,” and “[i]n no category can the marginal
differences in white and African-American behavior explain the huge disparity in
arrest or incarceration rates.” Id. at 19. Black youth are arrested at twice the rate of
white youth for drug offenses and 2.5 times the rate of white youth for weapons
offenses, even though white youth report substantially higher levels of drug use and
commission of weapons crimes. Id. at 20–21; see also FELD, supra note 21, at 138
(noting that a “consistent finding of delinquency sentencing research is that after
statistical controls for legal variables, juveniles’ race affects dispositions”).
292. Michael Leiber & Nancy Rodriguez, The Implementation of the Disproportionate Minority
Confinement/Contact (DMC) Mandate: A Failure or Success?, 1 RACE & JUST. 103, 105 (2011).
293. Easy Access to Juvenile Populations: 1990–2018, supra note 286; Statistical Briefing
Book: Law Enforcement & Juvenile Crime, OFF. JUV. JUST. & DELINQ. PREVENTION (Jan. 1,
2019), https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/ucr_trend.asp?table_in=2 [https://
perma.cc/7T6E-C2YR].
294. Arrests, CHI. YOUTH JUST. DATA PROJECT (2010), http://www.
chicagoyouthjustice.com/Project_NIA_Arrests_page_v2.html [https://perma.cc/US2HHQEC]; see also JOSHUA ROVNER, SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITIES IN YOUTH
COMMITMENTS AND ARRESTS (2016), https://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/
uploads/2016/04/Racial-Disparities-in-Youth-Commitments-and-Arrests.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9KAA-969B].
295. See John Wooldredge et al., Is the Impact of Cumulative Disadvantage on
Sentencing Greater for Black Defendants?, 14 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 187, 189 (2015)
(recognizing that “less desirable outcomes at later decision points” may be
attributable to “less desirable dispositions at earlier decision points”).
296. These can include high levels of violence, including the use of excessive force
and restraints by staff, sexual assault, and isolation. RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY
FOUND., NO PLACE FOR KIDS: THE CASE FOR REDUCING JUVENILE INCARCERATION 5 (2011),
https://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED527944.pdf [https://perma.cc/3PQG-4V3H].
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are 1.5 times as likely.297 Even as levels of youth confinement have
declined overall, the racial gap between Black and Indigenous youth
versus white youth has increased.298
To date, hundreds of multiple regression studies have been
conducted on disparities in the juvenile court, and nearly two-thirds
have documented a statistically significant “race effect” on decision
making, which suggests that race-neutral criteria cannot, by
themselves, account for these disparate outcomes.299 In other words,
but for the presence of racial bias, juveniles of color would not be
overrepresented to the degree that they are.
Multiple studies have detected the presence of racial bias in
decision making among justice system stakeholders, including police
officers,300 judges,301 probation officers,302 and defense attorneys.303 A

297. Easy Access to the Census of Juveniles in Residential Placement: 1997–2017, NAT’L
CTR. JUV. JUST., https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/ezacjrp/asp/Age_Race.asp [https://
perma.cc/KP6Y-A9VV] (last updated Apr. 23, 2019).
298. ROVNER, supra note 294, at 1.
299. See, e.g., CARL E. POPE & WILLIAM FEYERHERM, MINORITIES AND THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM: RESEARCH SUMMARY 2, 13–14 (1995) (confirming the
overrepresentation of minorities in the juvenile justice system); Bishop, supra note
42, at 61–62 (providing empirical demonstration of racial disparities in juvenile
justice); Rodney L. Engen et al., Racial Disparities in the Punishment of Youth: A
Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of the Literature, 49 SOC. PROBS. 194, 195 (2002)
(“review[ing] . . . theoretical perspectives on racial disparity . . . [and] highlighting
the central predictions of each perspective”); Leiber, supra note 283, at 3 (identifying
“the extent of minority overrepresentation in states’ juvenile justice systems and
assessment of the causes of DMC”); see also Carl E. Pope & Michael J. Leiber,
Disproportionate Minority Confinement/Contact (DMC): The Federal Initiative, in OUR
CHILDREN, THEIR CHILDREN: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DIFFERENCES IN
AMERICAN JUVENILE JUSTICE 351, 352 (providing “a historical overview of the activities
employed to address disproportionate minority youth confinement/contact”).
300. See, e.g., Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and Racial
Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006, 1009–13, 1015–17
(2007) (finding that police officers were more likely to shoot a Black person than a
white person in a video-game simulation in which they were instructed to shoot if the
person was armed); Sandra Graham & Brian S. Lowery, Priming Unconscious Racial
Stereotypes About Adolescent Offenders, 28 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 483, 499 (2004)
(documenting the impact of written racial cues on police and probation officers’
judgments about the “culpability, likely recidivism, and deserved punishment” of
hypothetical offenders).
301. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777,
784 (2001) (reporting on a study of 167 federal magistrate judges, which revealed
that they are susceptible to “heuristics” and biases when making decisions); Michael
J. Leiber & Kristan C. Fox, Race and the Impact of Detention on Juvenile Justice Decision
Making, 51 CRIME & DELINQ. 470, 489–90 (2005) (attributing observed negative race
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study of juvenile probation officers conducted more than twenty years
ago continues to be illuminating. In 1998, in an attempt to determine
why Black youth in three Washington State counties were receiving
harsher sentencing recommendations than white youth charged with
the same crimes, sociologists George Bridges and Sara Steen examined
more than 200 county probation reports.304 After controlling for factors
such as age, gender, and offense history, Bridges and Steen found that
the officers were more likely to attribute the criminal behavior of Black
youth to “internal attributions,” such as personal failure, inadequate
moral character, and personality, but saw the criminal behavior of
white youth as a product of “external attributions,” such as poor
home life, lack of appropriate role models, and environment.305
These perceptions, in turn, led the officers to recommend state
intervention for minority youth at greater rates.306 This and other
similar studies demonstrate the nefarious role that racial bias can play
in juvenile court outcomes for children of color.
Finally, there is a limited body of research examining the
relationship between race and representation and lawyers’ impact on
juveniles’ dispositions.307 One study reported that prosecutors charged
effects in outcomes to “racial stereotyping of African Americans as delinquent, prone
to drug offenses, dangerous, and unsuitable for treatment”).
302. See, e.g., Bridges & Steen, supra note 44, at 567 (concluding that probation
officers’ written rationales for sentencing recommendations indicated that they were
more likely to attribute the criminal behavior of minority youth to internal forces,
such as personal failure, inadequate moral character, and personality, and the
criminal behavior of white youth to external forces, such as environment, even when
the objective risk factors associated with the youth were similar).
303. Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial Attitudes of Death
Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1539, 1553 (2004) (finding that capital defense
attorneys exhibit the same levels of implicit bias as the rest of the population).
304. Bridges & Steen, supra note 44, at 557–58; see also Phillip Atiba Goff et al., The
Essence of Innocence: Consequences of Dehumanizing Black Children, 106 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 526, 529–35 (2014) (explaining the findings of a study that suggested
that individuals perceive Black youths to be less innocent than white youths after
turning ten years old).
305. Bridges & Steen, supra note 44, at 561, 564, 566–67 (emphasis omitted).
306. Bridges & Steen, supra note 44, at 564–67.
307. See, e.g., Gaylene S. Armstrong & Bitna Kim, Juvenile Penalties for “Lawyering
Up”: The Role of Counsel and Extralegal Case Characteristics, 57 CRIME & DELINQ. 827, 832
(2011) (noting few studies address the impact of counsel on juvenile minorities);
Barry C. Feld, The Social Context of Juvenile Justice Administration: Racial Disparities in an
Urban Juvenile Court, in MINORITIES IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 66 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard
et al., eds., 1995) (describing racial disparities in sentencing across studies); Lori
Guevara et al., Race, Gender, and Legal Counsel: Differential Outcomes in Two Juvenile
Courts, 6 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 83, 83–84, 97, 99 (2008) (describing the
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Black youths with more serious crimes than white youths, which increased
their likelihood of representation.308 Higher rates of representation and
a youth’s minority status may expose her to higher rates of more severe
dispositions.309 Yet, again, these findings may be as easily attributed to
disparities in charging and a lack of training, funding, experience and
resources for lawyers who represent juveniles of color. The stark reality
remains that while youth of color are no longer subjected to Jim Crow
juvenile justice as it was administered in the first half of the twentieth
century, compared with white youths, they have fared worse in every
other way during the post-Gault era.
III. RACE, RIGHTS, AND REPRESENTATION IN THE JUVENILE COURT
Much of the scholarship generated in connection with Gault’s 50th
Anniversary has explored ways to buttress the right to counsel in juvenile
court.310 We agree that, within the juvenile court’s current framework,
many of these proposed procedural reforms are important. Yet, as
described in Section II.D, the primary sources of racial injustice in the
juvenile court are not a lack of procedural safeguards, but the overcriminalization, over-policing, and over-punishment of juveniles of color,
and the narratives and implicit racial biases that allow decision makers
continually to rationalize these choices.311 Even the best lawyers and most
robust procedures will not cure these substantive inequities. Evidence
suggests that they will be most effectively addressed not through additional
procedure, but through substantive reforms that target their sources.
impact of race and counsel on outcomes); Lori Guevara et al., Race, Legal
Representation, and Juvenile Justice: Issues and Concerns, 50 CRIME & DELINQ. 344, 344–45,
367 (2004) (discussing research on the impact of counsel on juvenile outcomes);
Jennifer H. Peck & Maude Beaudry-Cyr, Does Who Appears Before the Juvenile Court
Matter on Adjudication and Disposition Outcomes? The Interaction Between Client Race and
Lawyer Type, 39 J. CRIME & JUSTICE 131, 131–32 (2016) (reporting the impact of
counsel on juvenile outcomes is rarely considered or explained adequately).
308. See Feld, supra note 307, at 78 (reporting that Black youth are charged with
more serious crimes and are more likely to be represented).
309. See id. at 92–93 (finding the presence of counsel may aggravate outcomes for
a charged juvenile).
310. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
311. Within the criminal context, Paul Butler and others have linked the overincarceration of “poor people” and people of color to over-policing, the failure of
lawmakers to account for conditions that “breed some forms of law-breaking,”
“explicit and implicit bias by key actors in the criminal justice system, including
police, prosecutors, and judges,” the “crime control system of criminal justice, in
which guilt is presumed,” and, cumulatively, the creation of a “criminal caste.” Paul
D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2183–
85 (2013) (footnotes omitted).
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A. Buttressing Gault
A number of recent reports and articles have lamented Gault’s
unrealized promises and have detailed how,312 why313 and the extent
to which314 juveniles are denied access to counsel in the juvenile
court. Several of these commentators have also proposed responses.
We endorse several of these.
First and foremost, state legislatures must appropriate the funds
necessary for a fully functioning juvenile defense bar.315 For decades,
the legislative inclination to be “tough on crime” and avoid the
appearance of “coddling criminals” has contributed to underfunded
public defender systems, which in many instances provide the
appearance but not the reality of effective assistance of counsel. As
criminologist Kimberly Kempf-Leonard has observed:
[T]he real difficulty is not who should assist youths in delinquency
proceedings. The problem for any advocate is how to be effective
in a system that does not have much political clout, operates via
informal directives and procedures, and is administered by officials
who rarely are held accountable.316

Second, developmental psychologists have argued for decades that
most juveniles lack competence to exercise or waive legal rights.317
312. Several commentators have argued that counsel is appointed both too late,
see, e.g., Laura Cohen & Sandra Simkins, No More “Desert Devil’s Island”: The Right to
Counsel for Incarcerated Children, in RIGHTS, RACE, AND REFORM, supra note 15, at 227,
227, 231–32, 245 (arguing that Gault should extend to post-conviction proceedings);
Casey McGowan et al., Moving Forward from Gault, CHAMPION, Apr. 2017, at 22, 22, 24,
26 (arguing that Gault should extend to pre-trial proceedings), and removed too
early in the juvenile court process, see, e.g., Sandra Simkins & Laura Cohen, The
Critical Role of Post-Disposition Representation in Addressing the Needs of Incarcerated Youth,
8 J. MARSHALL L.J. 312, 315 (2015) (arguing that “post-dispositional” legal
representation for youth in extended custody is a constitutional requirement).
313. See, e.g., JESSICA FEIERMAN ET AL., JUVENILE LAW CTR., THE PRICE OF JUSTICE: THE
HIGH COST OF “FREE” COUNSEL FOR YOUTH IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 5–6, 14
(2018), https://jlc.org/sites/default/files/attachments/2018-07/Paying-For-Justice2018FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ5T-PHGP] (presenting evidence that
stringent financial eligibility requirements and hidden fees undermine juveniles’
access to counsel in jurisdictions across the country).
314. See generally NAT’L JUVENILE DEF. CTR., supra note 15 (describing obstacles to a
juvenile’s ability to get representation).
315. See Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 368–70 (implying the legislature
needs to allot funds for public defense attorneys).
316. Kimberly Kempf-Leonard, Does Having an Attorney Provide a Better Outcome?: The Right
to Counsel Does Not Mean Attorney Help Youths 9 CRIM. & PUB. POL’Y 357, 361–62 (2010).
317. See Thomas Grisso, Juveniles’ Capacity to Waive Miranda Rights: An Empirical
Analysis, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1134, 1166 (1980) (asserting the juvenile comprehension
of Miranda rights is deficient).
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Differences in age and competence would suggest that youths should
receive more, rather than fewer, procedural safeguards than adults to
protect them from punitive delinquency adjudications and their own
improvident decisions and developmental limitations. Legislatures
should recognize the developmental limitations of juveniles and
mandate consultation with counsel before waiver or stand-by counsel
for all juveniles charged with felonies, serious misdemeanors, or
juveniles who face out-of-home placement.318 While this would
impose substantial costs and burdens on legal services delivery in
many states, it is consistent with Gault’s promise.
Third, lawyers who represent juveniles must be well-trained and
skilled in juvenile law and practice. Law schools typically offer only a
single elective substantive course or clinic on juvenile justice, and these
often focus on family, adoption, or dependency procedures.319 Most
juvenile defenders receive little training “in adolescent development or
the range and relative effectiveness of various juvenile dispositions and
treatments.”320 The training of juvenile defenders, both during and
after law school, must be enhanced.
Fourth, eligibility for public defender services must be based on a
child’s resources rather than on parents’ income or their willingness
to hire a lawyer.321 Fees and court costs must also be eliminated.322
California did this in 2017. California Senate Bill 190 eliminates
public defender fees and administrative costs previously charged for
juvenile detention, probation supervision, electronic monitoring, and
drug testing.323 It also provides that parents must receive notice that
they “shall not be liable for the cost of counsel or legal assistance
furnished by the court for purposes of representing the minor.”324
Other states should follow suit.
Fifth, because of the rapidity of delinquency case-processing,
appointment of counsel should occur at the initial arraignment or
detention hearing, if not before, to allow sufficient time for investigation

318. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979) (prohibiting incarceration
without representation); FELD, supra note 148, at 248–49 (recommending a
prohibition against incarceration or removal from home without counsel).
319. Kempf-Leonard, supra note 316, at 360.
320. Id. at 360.
321. Cf. FELD, supra note 148, at 103–06 (discussing public defenders’
representation of juveniles).
322. Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 369 (asserting the “appointment of counsel
should not depend on the income of the parents or their willingness to hire a lawyer”).
323. S.B. 190, 2017–18 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017) (signed into law on October 11, 2017).
324. Id. § 12.
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and case preparation. Youth should also be guaranteed postdispositional
legal representation. Not only is there a strong argument that it is
constitutionally guaranteed,325 but it is also one of the only ways to
subject juvenile facilities to consistent observation and scrutiny.
Sixth, advocates have long claimed that “opening juvenile court to
public scrutiny . . . . increases the chances that courts will appoint
lawyers and that lawyers will do their jobs.”326 While we do not advocate
opening the doors to media and the general public, expanding
appellate review provides one of the most important means of increasing
the transparency and accountability of delinquency proceedings and
ensuring that juveniles’ right to counsel is respected.327
Finally, a state supreme court or other criminal justice agency
should require data on appointment of counsel to be collected in
real time with administrative oversight to immediately flag and rectify
cases in which youths appeared without counsel.328 Data collection
must include both a youth’s race and representation status.
B. A Critique of Procedural Rights
A number of scholars have focused on what they see as the inherent
limitations and unintended consequences of an overreliance on
procedural rights. According to William Stuntz, it is nearly impossible
to improve the justice system through criminal procedure reforms
alone because the legislative and executive branches of government
have myriad ways to compensate for and evade compliance with the
Court’s mandates.329

325. Simkins & Cohen, supra note 312, at 342 (“[A]lthough Gault addressed only
‘proceedings to determine delinquency,’ . . . subsequent federal appellate court
decisions have assumed that the more expansive guarantee of the Sixth Amendment
applies with full force to youth charged with delinquency.” (footnote omitted)).
326. Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 370.
327. See Harris, supra note 205, at 228–29 (asserting accountability in juvenile courts is
improved with appellate review); Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 370 (asserting
appellate review is a method of accountability present when juveniles have counsel).
328. Schwartz & Levick, supra note 257, at 371.
329. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power, and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 553, 561–62 (1992) (“[O]vercriminalization is an easy
way to get around Fourth Amendment restrictions.”); Stuntz, supra note 171, at 70–
71, 76 (asserting countermajoritarian criminal procedure can lead to overbroad
criminal statutes and underfunded defense counsel); see also Richard A. Posner, The
Most Punitive Nation, TIMES LITERARY SUPPLEMENT, Sept. 1, 1995, at 3, 4 (arguing that
legislatures have responded to increased constitutional rights for criminals by
making punishments more severe).
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In a legislatively funded system with state-paid prosecutors and defense
attorneys, judge-made procedural rights are bound to have some perverse
effects, pushing prosecutors and defense attorneys and legislators and
even the judges themselves in uncomfortable directions.330

Other commentators have argued that an overreliance on
procedural rights can also serve to legitimate institutions that might
otherwise become unstable by creating the illusion that the problem is
fixed331 or risk of “entrenching” and “legitimating” the infirmities in
question.332 Carol and Jordan Steiker have argued, for example, that
the Court’s imposition of procedural constraints on capital
punishment instilled a false sense of “faith among justice system
participants and the general public in the reliability and fairness of
the process” and had the unintended effect of further entrenching
the punishment itself.333
Paul Butler and Gabriel Chin have extended these procedural
rights critiques to Gideon. Gideon “demonstrates the critique of rights”
by “divert[ing] attention from economic and racial critiques of the
criminal justice system” and “provid[ing] legitimation of the status
quo,” Butler writes.334 Chin argues that Gideon “has not been and
likely cannot be a remedy for systematic racial disproportionality in
the criminal justice system” because, despite the Warren Court’s
concern about institutional racism, Gideon was not designed to
address it.335 Paradoxically, he claims, Gideon and its progeny may
have made racial disproportionality worse by improving outcomes for
white defendants.336 “At the same time,” Chin notes, Gideon “formally
and perhaps more broadly legitimates these racially disparate results
because convictions obtained against defendants who had counsel are
presumptively valid.”337

330. Stuntz, supra note 171, at 5.
331. See, e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 719,
721, 746 (1992) (arguing that Brown v. Board of Education and Miranda v. Arizona “traded
the promise of substantial reform implicit in prior doctrine for a political symbol”).
332. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Lessons for Law Reform from the American
Experiment with Capital Punishment, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 748–49 (2014) (defining
entrench as incremental reform that diminishes the need for larger reform and
defining legitimate as incremental reform that creates an illusion of reliability).
333. CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH: THE SUPREME
COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4, 155–56 (2016).
334. Butler, supra note 311, at 2178, 2196–97.
335. Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2236,
2238–39 (2013).
336. Id. at 2238, 2254–55.
337. Id. at 2258.
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The same can be said about Gault. Despite its well-documented
concern about racial inequality, the Warren Court chose a case
involving a white juvenile as the vehicle to address fairness and
inequality in the juvenile court. And in doing so, it relied exclusively
on a series of race-neutral procedural rules. As critical as the rights to
counsel, notice, and confrontation may be to the accuracy and
regularity of juvenile court proceedings, they are unlikely to alleviate
the profound racial inequities that were pervasive in the juvenile
court at the time of Gault and which remain so today. Indeed, these
inequities have only increased since Gault was decided, not least
because the legislative and executive branches of government have
compensated for and evaded compliance with Gault’s mandates.338 By
creating the illusion that the juvenile court had somehow been fixed,
Gault may also have removed the impetus for substantive reforms that
may benefit juveniles of color. We discuss some of these below.
C. Toward Substantive Reform
Even if Gault’s protections were fully buttressed, however, its
procedural mandates would not fundamentally alter the primary
sources of systemic disproportionality in the juvenile court. Instead,
we argue, the substantive problem of racial disproportionality in the
juvenile court requires substantive policy reforms. We identify three.
This analysis is timely. In the wake of a series of recent Supreme
Court decisions recognizing that children are constitutionally
different from adults for purposes of punishment, legislatures and
courts across the country are engaged in juvenile court reform.339
Gault’s racial legacy should be instructive. As important as procedural
rights may be to institutional fairness and accuracy, we contend that
substantive policy reform should be the priority.
1.

Decriminalizing non-violent youthful behavior
Since Gault was decided, nearly every state has dramatically
expanded its criminal code.340 When it comes to youth, the impact of
338. See Stuntz, supra note 329, at 561–62 (“[O]vercriminalization is an easy way to
get around Fourth Amendment restrictions.”); Stuntz, supra note 171, at 54, 70–71,
76; see also Posner, supra note 329, at 4 (arguing that legislatures have responded to
increased constitutional rights for criminals by making punishments more severe).
339. See generally Perry L. Moriearty, The Trilogy and Beyond, 62 S.D. L. REV. 539
(2017) (examining state legislatures’ reactions to the Court’s decisions in Roper v.
Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama).
340. See generally Andrea L. Dennis, Decriminalizing Childhood, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1,
5, 8–9 (2017) (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL 2013, supra note 151); Roger A. Fairfax,
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this “over-criminalization” trend has been compounded by the
concomitant criminalization of behavior that is non-criminal for
adults, such as truancy, curfew violations, alcohol consumption, and
consensual sexual activity.341 The statistics are alarming: of the nearly
55,000 youth confined in juvenile facilities on a given day in 2013,
5000 were placed out of home for a technical violation, such as
failure to appear for a probation meeting or drug test.342 More
troubling still, 67% were youth of color.343 Black and Native American
youth were almost four times as likely as white youth to be placed out
of home on this basis.344
Legislatively converting most criminal misdemeanors to civil
infractions and/or reducing criminal penalties to noncustodial
intervention for nonviolent, youthful conduct and status offenses
would have an immediate impact on these racial inequities. Over the
last several years, lawmakers in Texas, Ohio, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Idaho, and California have taken steps to decriminalize status
offenses such as truancy, alcohol possession, and transit fare evasion
to great effect.345 These efforts should be expanded.
2.

Expanding diversion
Beyond the wholesale reorientation of local law enforcement
policies, an obvious response to the over-policing of juveniles of color
is increased reliance on diversion—both informal, pre-charge
diversion without mandated requirements for low-level behavior and
formal diversion with community-based programming and services
for more serious conduct.346 Diversion programs exist in jurisdictions

Jr., From “Overcriminalization” to “Smart on Crime”: American Criminal Justice Reform—Legacy
and Prospects, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 597 (2011) (“emphasiz[ing] fairness and accuracy in
the administration of criminal justice”); Ellen S. Podgor, Overcriminalization: New
Approaches to a Growing Problem, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 529 (2012) (introducing
the fight against overcriminalization after 1966).
341. Dennis, supra note 340, at 8–9.
342. BURNS INST., supra note 289, at 10, 17.
343. Id. at 10.
344. Id. at 4.
345. Dennis, supra note 340, at 30–31, 33; Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanor
Decriminalization, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1055, 1067–69 (2015) (asserting decriminalization
can be enacted by legislature, courts, or law enforcement).
346. See Stephanie Béchard et al., Arbitrary Arbitration: Diverting Juveniles into the
Justice System—A Reexamination after 22 Years, 55 INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMPAR.
CRIM. 605, 606, 621–22 (2011).
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throughout the country.347 While critical questions remain about how
to determine which youth should be diverted and the risk of “net
widening,” there is evidence that increased reliance on diversion
could substantially benefit youth of color.348
3.

Constraining juvenile punishment
In a trilogy of cases beginning in 2005, the Court issued three
decisions imposing substantive constraints on the harshest forms of
juvenile punishment: banning the execution of individuals under
eighteen in Roper v. Simmons,349 banning life sentences without the
possibility of parole for juveniles who had not committed homicide in
Graham v. Florida,350 and banning life without parole for all juveniles
when imposed mandatorily in Miller v. Alabama.351 In each case, the
Court applied the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment to juveniles, emphasizing their reduced culpability
and impaired competence to exercise procedural rights.352
All three decisions emphasized that juveniles’ immature judgment
and limited self-control causes them to act impulsively and without
adequate appreciation of consequences;353 their susceptibility to negative
peers and inability to escape criminogenic environments reduce their
responsibility;354 and their transitory personality provides less reliable
347. Bernard E. Harcourt, Risk as a Proxy for Race: The Dangers of Risk Assessment, 27
FED. SENT’G REP. 237, 241 (2015) (recommending diversion programs to reduce
racial disparity in incarceration).
348. See Traci Schlesinger, Decriminalizing Racialized Youth through Juvenile Diversion,
28 FUTURE CHILD. 59, 60, 66, 68–70 (2018) (asserting youth of color are excluded
from diversion programs).
349. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
350. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
351. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
352. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and
Sentencing Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 L. & INEQ.
263, 263–64 (2013) (explaining these cases’ impact on juvenile criminal law); Barry
C. Feld, Competence and Culpability: Delinquents in Juvenile Court, Youths in Criminal
Court, 102 MINN. L. REV. 473, 549–69 (2017); Barry C. Feld, The Youth Discount: Old
Enough To Do the Crime, Too Young To Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107 (2013)
(tracing the effects of these three cases).
353. Roper, 543 U.S. at 569 (“[A] lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults and are more understandable
among the young. These qualities often result in impetuous and ill-considered actions
and decisions.” (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993))).
354. Id. at 569 (“[J]uveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.” (citing Eddings v
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982))). The Court explained: “Their own
vulnerability and comparative lack of control over their immediate surroundings
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evidence of enduring blameworthiness.355 The Court in Graham also
noted that developmental characteristics impaired juveniles’ defenses
and increased the likelihood of improvident waivers of counsel:356
[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them
at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles
mistrust adults and have limited understandings of the criminal
justice system and the roles of the institutional actors within it.
They are less likely than adults to work effectively with their lawyers
to aid in their defense. Difficulty in weighing long-term
consequences; a corresponding impulsiveness; and reluctance to
trust defense counsel, seen as part of the adult world a rebellious
youth rejects, all can lead to poor decisions by one charged with a
juvenile offense. These factors are likely to impair the quality of a
juvenile defendant’s representation.357

The reaction to this trilogy of cases was akin to the reaction to
Gault. Scholars believed that not only might this jurisprudence
impact other juvenile processing358 and sentencing decisions359 and
extend to other vulnerable populations;360 it had the potential to
transform the regulation of sentencing in the United States.361

mean juveniles have a greater claim than adults to be forgiven for failing to escape
negative influences in their whole environment.” Id. at 570.
355. Id. at 570 (“[T]he character of a juvenile is not as well formed as that of an
adult.”). Because juveniles’ character is transitional, “[f ]rom a moral standpoint it
would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor ’s character deficiencies will be reformed.” Id.
356. The Supreme Court in Graham v. Florida emphasized juveniles’ inability to
work with counsel. “[T]he features that distinguish juveniles from adults also put
them at a significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings. Juveniles mistrust adults
and have limited understandings of the criminal justice system and the roles of the
institutional actors within it. They are less likely than adults to work effectively with
their lawyers to aid in their defense.” 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010).
357. Id. at 78 (citations omitted).
358. See generally Neelum Arya, Using Graham v. Florida to Challenge Juvenile
Transfer Laws, 71 LA. L. REV. 99 (2010) (suggesting that lawyers use Graham to ensure
that all children under eighteen are given a change to atone for their crimes as well
as establish a constitutional right to rehabilitation).
359. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Breen & John R. Mills, Mandating Discretion: Juvenile
Sentencing Schemes After Miller v. Alabama, 52 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 293, 307–09 (2015)
(describing reasons for the individualized sentencing of juveniles).
360. See, e.g., Helen Shin, Is the Death of the Death Penalty Near?: The Impact of Atkins
and Roper on the Future of Capital Punishment for Mentally Ill Defendants, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
465, 477–78, 480–81 (2007) (discussing how excessive punishments are judged by
currently prevailing standards and how defendants with diminished capacity are not likely
to be deterred); Bruce J. Winick, The Supreme Court’s Evolving Death Penalty Jurisprudence:
Severe Mental Illness as the Next Frontier, 50 B.C. L. REV. 785, 819–20 (2009) (analyzing how
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Though a number of commentators have lamented the slow,
uneven and, in some cases, non-existent implementation of these
decisions,362 it is indisputable that they have had a meaningful impact
on juvenile sentencing in this country. Since 2012, more than twenty states
have abolished juvenile life without parole,363 more than 2200 sentences
rendered unconstitutional by Roper, Graham, and Miller have been
vacated,364 and hundreds of individuals sentenced to death or life without
parole for crimes committed as juveniles have been resentenced.365
Beyond its application to juvenile life without parole itself, the Court’s
developmental framework is likely to influence numerous juvenile
sentencing policies and practices, including mandatory minimum

the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for defendants with mental illness
because it does not meet the penological goals of retribution and deterrence).
361. See, e.g., Rachel Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 49
(2010) (“It would be hard to overstate the significance of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Graham v. Florida.”); Cara H. Drinan, The Miller Revolution, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 1787, 1788 (2016) (arguing that Miller was revolutionary in logic and scope);
Scott E. Sundby, The True Legacy of Atkins and Roper: The Unreliability Principle,
Mentally Ill Defendants, and the Death Penalty’s Unraveling, 23 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
487, 487 (2014) (arguing that “the cases have a far more revolutionary reach than
their conventional understanding”).
362. See Robert S. Chang et al., Evading Miller, 39 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 85, 86–92,
105–06 (2015) (examining the implementation of Miller); Laura Cohen, Freedom’s
Road: Youth, Parole, and the Promise of Miller v. Alabama and Graham v. Florida,
35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1031, 1087 (2014) (proposing substantial changes in juvenile
sentencing to implement changes from Graham and Miller); Cara H. Drinan,
Graham on the Ground, 87 WASH. L. REV. 51, 64–82 (2012) (analyzing the
implementation of Graham); Perry L. Moriearty, Implementing Proportionality, 50 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 961, 1028 (2017) (arguing the Court needs to provide guidance on
defining the population of intellectually disabled and juvenile person for
proportional sentencing relief); Moriearty, supra note 339, at 540 (noting difficulty in
implementing the juvenile sentencing reform following Roper, Graham, and Miller).
363. States That Ban Life Without Parole for Children, CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENT’G
OF YOUTH, https://www.fairsentencingofyouth.org/media-resources/states-that-banlife [https://perma.cc/TWA6-ULJ4].
364. The Miller Court estimated that approximately 2000 inmates in the United
States were serving mandatory life without parole sentences for offenses they
committed as juveniles, Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 493–94 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting), the Graham Court identified 123 inmates who were sentenced as juveniles
to life without parole for offenses other than homicide, Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
64 (2010), and 72 inmates were impacted by Roper. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., THE
DEATH PENALTY IN 2004: YEAR END REPORT 2 (2004), http://www.death
penaltyinfo.org/files/pdf/DPICyer04.pdf [https://perma.cc/F7YL-V5N7].
365. CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENTENCING OF YOUTH, RIGHTING WRONGS: THE FIVE-YEAR
GROUNDSWELL OF STATE BANS ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILDREN 7 (2016),
https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/righting-wrongs [https://perma.cc/AV55-38AG].
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sentencing laws, automatic transfer statutes, sexual offender registration
requirements, and any other laws that purport to treat juveniles and adults
identically.366 As Justice Roberts lamented in his dissent in Miller, “[t]here
is no clear reason that [the] principle [that children and adults are
different for purposes of sentencing] would not bar all mandatory
sentences for juveniles, or any juvenile sentence as harsh as what a
similarly situated adult would receive.”367 Indeed, if juveniles are
inherently less culpable than their adult counterparts when it comes to
homicide, they are less culpable when it comes to other offenses as well. In
fact, in the wake of Miller, several states have amended their laws to make
adult court transfer more difficult.368 Plainly, this jurisprudence has begun
to shape, and is likely to continue to shape, juvenile punishment and
crime regulation in areas beyond homicide sentencing.369 Because the vast
majority of juveniles subjected to this country’s harshest sentences are
youth of color, they stand to benefit most from these constraints.370
366. See id. at 3, 7.
367. Miller, 567 U.S. at 501 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
368. In the wake of Miller, several states have made adult court transfer more
difficult. See Anne Teigen, 2013 Juvenile Justice State Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminaljustice/2013-juvenile-justice-state-legislation.aspx#1 [https://perma.cc/KB4K-RDR3].
369. For example, a number of scholars and policy groups have advocated for a
legislatively enacted “Youth Discount” in sentencing that uses age as a proxy for
diminished criminal responsibility that would impose shorter sentences for youths
than adults convicted of similar crimes. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
§ 6.11A reporter’s note a (AM. L. INST., Tentative Draft No. 2, 2011) (acknowledging
that the framework for “specialized sentencing rules and mitigated treatment of
juvenile offenders sentenced in adult courts, owes” much to [Feld’s” proposal for a
Youth Discount]—a sliding scale of developmental and criminal responsibility”);
FELD, supra note 18, at 315–20 (discussing the youth discount concept as a mitigating
factor in juvenile sentencing); FELD, supra note 21, at 220–23; ELIZABETH S. SCOTT &
LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 246 (2008) (agreeing that
“[p]roportionality supports imposing statutory limits on the maximum duration of
adult sentences impose[d] on juveniles—a ‘youth discount,’ to use Feld’s term”); James
C. Howell et al., Young Offenders and an Effective Justice System Response, in FROM JUVENILE
DELINQUENCY TO ADULT CRIME: CRIMINAL CAREERS, JUSTICE POLICY, AND PREVENTION 213
(Rolf Loeber & David P. Farrington eds., 2012) (concluding that “[y]ouths’ diminished
responsibility required mitigated sanctions to avoid permanently life-changing
penalties and provide room to reform”); David S. Tanenhaus & Steven A. Drizin, Owing
to the Extreme Youth of the Accused: The Changing Legal Response to Juvenile Homicide, 92, J.
CRIM. L.& CRIMINOLOGY 641, 697–98 (2003) (endorsing “Feld’s proposals [for a youth
discount] because they respect the notion that juveniles are developmentally
different than adults and that these differences make juveniles both less culpable for
their crimes and less deserving of the harsh sanctions, which now must be imposed
on serious and violent adults offenders”).
370. See supra Section II.D.
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4.

Reducing implicit racial bias
Finally, studies suggest that cognitive biases are not inevitable, and
stereotypes are not immutable. Research shows that the automaticity
of biases can be neutralized through repeated negation of stereotypic
associations, affirmation of positive associations with the cohort in
question,371 and “social tuning,”372 which can be accomplished
through relationship building with the target.373 When decision makers
are made aware of their biases and are motivated to self-correct, they
have the capacity to reduce their reliance on stereotypes.374 A relatively
simple initial step would be the initiation of trainings to educate
stakeholders about the pervasiveness and effects of implicit racial
biases and to encourage them to self-examine.
CONCLUSION
The 50th Anniversary of In re Gault generated enormous interest
and attention for good reason. The 1967 decision fundamentally
altered the arc of juvenile justice in the United States. It took what
until then had been an insulated, legal backwater system and
subjected it to legal and eventually public scrutiny. In doing so, the
Court brought to the juvenile court a measure of regularity and
accountability that it badly needed. But if part of the Court’s mission was
to improve outcomes for Black children, who, over the course of the
juvenile court’s first fifty years were subjected to unequal and, in some
cases, outright horrific treatment, Gault has not been a success. In fact,
there is considerable evidence that the decision has made things worse.
In part, this is a function of the Court’s decision to endorse procedural
formality in the juvenile court while simultaneously rejecting a
constitutional framework that might have given teeth to its procedural
mandates. The net effect of these decisions was unintended and
multifarious; it ushered in the transformation of the juvenile court
from a quasi-social welfare agency to a formal legal institution that was
as adversarial as its adult counterpart but lacked many of its core
371. See Irene V. Blair, The Malleability of Automatic Stereotypes and Prejudice, 6
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 242, 248–49 (2002) (discussing suppression of
stereotypes and the promotion of opposing counter-stereotypes).
372. See Graham & Lowery, supra note 44, at 501 (promoting “social tuning” as a
means to counter unconscious bias in the juvenile justice system); Brian S. Lowery et
al., Social Influence Effects on Automatic Racial Prejudice, 81 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
842, 851–52 (2001) (reporting experimental data supporting the same conclusion).
373. Graham & Lowery, supra note 44, at 501.
374. Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race Bias: A Prejudice
Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267 (2012).
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protections. In doing so, the Court also unwittingly prompted the
juvenile court’s ideological reorientation from the “best interests” of the
child to the gravity of the child’s offense375—one that has proved
especially pernicious for the very defendants whose plight animated the
Warren Court’s jurisprudence: Black children.
Finally, we argue, the Court’s error was also conceptual. The primary
source of racial injustice in the juvenile court was then what it is now—
social-structural inequality, too many crimes, too much punishment, and
too many arrests and prosecutions of juveniles of color. These systemic
disparities will not be reduced by additional or enhanced procedures.
Because they are substantive problems, they must be addressed through
substantive remedies. Gault did not and cannot do this.

375. See FELD, supra note 18, at 162–65 (demonstrating the shift in juvenile rights
and explaining that in that context, “procedural reforms cannot compensate for the
highly discretionary substantive standards—‘best interests of the child’ or a ‘serious
risk’ of future crime—that preclude evenhanded enforcement and lend themselves
to discriminatory applications”).

